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Abstract 
 
This 4th semester project is analyzing the reasons behind the 2008 bankruptcy of Roskilde Bank. 
On the theoretical level Friedman´s Monetarism is analyzed alongside Keynesianism, comparing 
the two and the effects of the financial liberation taking place since the 1980´ s. In order to assess 
other possible reasons for the bankruptcy, the Principal/Agent theory is used to analyze whether 
the bank management was working as efficiently and professionally as it is expected from a 
management in a bank of this size. It is analyzed that the bankruptcy is a result of the financial 
liberation mentioned above, combined with a too big and risky exposure towards the real-estate 
market. These two factors aggregated with bad banking caused this particular bankruptcy. The 
exposure to the real-estate market was a consequence of bad banking. It is concluded that there 
cannot be legislated against bankruptcies as the one analyzed in the paper, as there cannot be 
legislated against bad banking. 
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Introduction 
Motivation 
 
During the years of financial crisis there were many financial institutions (banks, commercial 
banks, investment banks) all over the world which were affected. As a result these institutions 
where taken over by or merged with, other financial institutions or declared insolvent or 
liquidated. Banks failure are disastrous on the national level and also on a personal level.  
 
This project report was aimed at a bank’s failure. This project will take the case of Roskilde 
bank, which went bankrupt in 2008. Our curiosity was awaken when finding out that before its 
bankruptcy, Roskilde Bank was getting closer in importance to the biggest Danish banks, what is 
normally unusual for a small local bank. Even 5 years after the bankruptcy it is still fiercely 
debated amongst the government.  
 
This project will therefore try to find out if the failure of the bank could be explained by using 
two opposing theories through our project. Some primary qualitative data and secondary data 
will be used in order to support this idea of bankruptcy. 
Problem area 
 
The epidemic of the financial crisis remained from 2007 and had its outbreak in 2008 due to a 
complex interaction of assessment and liquidity problems in the U.S. banking system. The 
financial crisis had a big impact for the whole world’s economy.  It was one of the main reason 
businesses turning having sore problems in their economy. Financial crisis influenced stock 
prices declining, job losses, rising unemployment and it has also had its impact on the number of 
bankruptcies. The increased unemployment came as a natural consequence of downsizing and 
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bankruptcies, as it coasted a lot of jobs. The next step is that people therefore should take better 
care of their money and it would be a lot more beneficial if they let the money stay in the bank 
rather than getting it out of their pockets. The private consumption is declining during a crisis. 
All this is not something that is helping to improve the economy, as the ordinary consumer will 
have to get the money out of his pocket and to circulate. Consumption is helping to get the 
economy to make ends meet. 
 
In Denmark, the crisis had its crucial outbreak in January 2008. When many of the bank's loans 
has been in the real estate market, and several of these large loans are distributed on a few 
customers. The Bank's mission has also been to reduce these massive loans, which have failed, 
something that can be caused by the financial crisis. The case about Roskilde Bank began on the 
24th August 2008, where Denmark’s National bank and the Private Contingency Association of 
Ailing Banks, Savings Banks and Cooperative Banks, took over all assets except hybrid core 
capital and subordinated loan capital in Roskilde Bank A/S. The reason for the acquisition is that 
the liquidation of Roskilde Bank had to be done with the best economic returns for shareholders, 
customers and employees. It was an attempt to rescue the bank, thus ensuring that there would 
not be instability in the financial market in Denmark. Other banks in Denmark were dependent 
on borrowing money internationally and a bankruptcy could make this difficult. 
 
In the first quarter of 2008 it appeared in the account that the bank still managed to generate 
money, despite higher depreciations than expected. After this report came, there were still clear 
expectations that the bank would come out of 2008 with a profit of between 610 - 620 million 
kroner2. As the interim report came, it turned out that the bank had to downgrade those 
expectations. The expectation around the 1st half of 2008 showed a minus of 520 to 540 million 
kroner3. This is because the bank had been forced to make further write-downs on both loans and 
provisions for guarantees. This report came five days after the National Bank took over its 
activities.  
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We will be using Friedman's theory of economic monetarism analyses why and the reason 
behind Roskilde Bank's bankruptcy and by incorporating Keynes's and Minsky's opposing 
theories reduce the probabilities for liquidity crisis in the future so that it will not happen again. 
We are going to look at the macroeconomic aspects which mainly are about banking regulation 
and money creation and the changes in the regulations. Also macroeconomic perspective in order 
to see what does the financial sector to the socio-economic development in a broader sense We 
will be also analyzing Principal Agent theory, to see whether the bank was managed well. We 
are intending to apply three interviews in our project and will be using them as a link between 
theories and the case.  
 
Problem definition 
 
· How can Roskilde’s Bank failure be explained and compared through the use of our theories? 
 
Research questions 
 
When looking at the Keynesian banking theory, how can the failure of a bank be explained? 
When looking at Friedman’s theory how the bank failure can be explained? 
Was the board aware that the bank was on the verge of a bankruptcy? 
How has the data collected being able to support the chosen theories? 
 
 
Case study 
 
We are making a Case Study Research about Roskilde’s Bank bankruptcy and our goal by doing 
that is to design a good case study, to collect and analyze data surrounding the case and the most 
important one is to make our case study to closure by writing a compelling report. A case study, 
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as a research strategy “allows investigators to retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of 
real – life events – such as individual life cycles, organizational and managerial process 
neighborhood change, international relations and the maturation of industries.” (Yin, 2003, p.2) 
So it is not surprising that case study can help to understand complex business or economical 
phenomena, in which the structure of given industry or the economy of the company may be 
investigated by using case study method. (Yin, 2003, p.1) In our case we are doing a case study 
of a banking industry and its economy. 
 
We are going to use “Case Study Research. Design and Methods” book written by Robert K. Yin 
as a research tool, because it helps us to understand and to apply one of the approaches of case 
studies. So first of all we are starting to analyze what type of case study we are doing. From the 
beginning it is clear that we are doing explanatory case study, our problem definition and our 
research questions tells that, we are combining theory with the case. According to Yin, question 
which starts “how” are more explanatory and leads us to use case studies. Our problem definition 
is: How can Roskilde’s Bank failure be explained and compared through the use of our theories? 
 
Case study design  
 
When doing a case study we need to make a case study design, if we want to set a plan for 
ourselves in order to reach the goal.  
 
According to Yin, there are five components of such research design: study questions, its 
propositions, units of analysis, the logic linking the data to the propositions, the criteria of 
interpreting the findings. (Yin, 2003, p.21) In our case we are going to limit those components 
and the main focus to give for the questions which were mentioned before and the units of 
analysis. The same one case study can involve more than one unit of analysis, like it is and in our 
example. So according to Yin, we are doing Embedded Single – Case design, it means that we 
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are doing one case with the same context, but just multiple units of analysis. Figure below shows 
our case study design which was made according to Robert K. Yin case study design.  
 
 
 
1st and 2nd units of analysis shows that we are going to look and use Keynesian’s and Friedman’s 
banking theories explains why Roskilde’s bank went bankrupt. It takes explaining part of the 
project report. 1st and 2nd units of analysis are the main ones and it takes the biggest part in our 
project. They are also a direct link to answer our problem formulation and to reach conclusions. 
3rd unit is made in order to find out about the case and other problems, which Roskilde bank had 
to face, like board awareness, if the bank was able to avoid the bankruptcy.  
The 4th unit of analysis explains and helps us to support the theories with data we chosen and 
deeper explains the problems. The other chapter is going to explain how we are going to make 
these analyses by using specific material, data and theory.  
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Project Design 
 
TASKS Theory and data How it is useful? 
1) Explanation through 
Friedman 
Friedman theory Finding the problems and applying 
them to the case in: 
-Free market, 
- Deregulation of the market 
-Privatization and  liberalization 
2) Explanation through 
Keynes and Minsky 
Keynes theory with 
Minsky’s 
interpretation 
Finding the problems and applying 
to the case in: 
-Regulation of the market 
-Government control of the 
financial sector 
3) Avoiding the 
bankruptcy with board 
awareness 
Principal agent theory - Clarifying problems which caused 
the end 
- Mismanagement problems 
reckless leading pattern/bad 
banking.      
Minsky - Avoiding  the bankruptcy 
- Improvement of the banking 
system 
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Interviews -Finding out the real problems 
-Suggestions from the experts 
-Evaluation of the case from three 
different positions 
4) Theories supporting 
data 
Interviews 
Annual reports 
-  Three experts views from three 
different positions in order to see 
the reality 
 
During the whole project we held some tasks for ourselves, what we want to investigate through 
this project. Our tasks are reflected through our research questions. And this chapter is mainly 
not just about the goals we want to reach, but also the data which we are using as a background 
for analyzing tasks and showing the connections between the project and theories/interviews we 
have collected. 
 
At first we are moving towards the introduction of the financial crisis, because that was one of 
the main reasons why the world’s economy went down. Then afterwards, we will be taking the 
worst scenario, bankruptcy in the financial sector. We are focusing on macroeconomic aspect in 
order to explain how the economic situation allowed poor business practices. We are aware that 
Roskilde Bank is an outlier, but it does show the "worst" case scenario.  
 
These two theories, (Keynes vs Friedman) will be introduced against each other in order to find 
deeper roots and an explanation of the bankruptcy. We are taking two opposing theories, because 
we want to investigate different scenarios. 
 
1) First of all we are taking Milton Friedman theory and trying to apply the free market idea and 
deregulation of the free market, to Roskilde bank and also privatization and liberalization of it. 
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Friedman’s theory is based on the idea that banks are never making mistakes and they can 
control themselves automatically and naturally without any government intervention. It is also 
based on the idea that banks can predict the future and see all the problems in advance.   
 
2) As an opposing theory we have chosen Keynes with Minsky’s interpretations. Which 
summarize regulation of all financial sector idea starting with regulation of the market and 
ending with government’s control of it. The main point which this theory is trying to investigate 
is that bank’s mistakes comes then there is lack of control in all these mentioned sectors and 
when it is uncontrolled the problems cannot be solved in time, because you cannot predict them. 
 
By investigating those two theories we want to see which scenario could cause a real problem for 
a bank like in our case – bankrupt, letting private banks “regulate” or Keynes and Minsky’s 
critique of no state involvement can also cause the same problem. 
 
3) Our third task is about how the bank could have avoided the bankruptcy with the board being 
aware. For this research question we are using Principal Agent which will lead us from the 
troubles in management (what happened to Roskilde bank) to how it could be improved. Also 
Minsky’s aspect in this part takes also a big role, because during  the process it is possible to find 
a discussion about what could have been done better in a banking structure, controlling in order 
to have stability in the financial sector. 
 
This part will also be answered through the interviews, we are going to have three of them and 
they will be divided in to three directions, one is going to support Roskilde Bank other will be in 
the opposition and the last one will be neutral and will look at it from the side. All these answers 
will be evaluated and analyzed from whole sides in order to get the right and valid answers.  
   
 
 
 
 
11 
 
 
4)  In this part we are going to go deeper in the interviews and in our collected data from the 
annual reports. And trying to understand if the crisis were foreseeable from the economical part 
of it.  
  
Our structure of the project and the importance of the tasks go in such direction: 
 
The next chapter is going to talk about philosophical part of methods in our project. 
 
Chapter Introduction 
 
We would like to introduce every chapter within the project to make it coherent and to obtain an 
optimal overview of the project. 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction and problem 
This chapter consists of our motivation to investigate this area plus our problem definition. The 
research questions will be mentioned as well as the limitations of the project. 
 
Chapter 2: Project design 
Within this chapter the design and approach of our project will be explained. And all the 
theories, data we are using for the project will be linked between each other. 
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
In this chapter we will clarify how we have organized our investigation which both includes 
quantitative and qualitative data. We are going to show our philosophical approach and how it 
will affect our project. 
 
Chapter 4: Background 
In this chapter we are talking about our case - Roskilde bank and its bankruptcy. Trying to 
mention all the things which can be useful for analyzing the entire.  
 
Chapter 5: Theories 
This chapter will be divided in to separate parts of theories, we are going to use the theories of 
Keynes through Minsky, Milton Friedman and Principal/Agent.  
 
Chapter 6: Analysis 
This chapter will reflect our case through the chosen theories, collected data and interview taken. 
Analysis will be also divided in to separate parts. 
 
Chapter 7: Discussion, perspective and conclusion 
This chapter consists of a discussion and a perspective followed by a conclusion of the overall 
project. This part of the project will be connecting all our separate theories and analysis made.  
 
Chapter 8: Bibliography and appendix 
This chapter consists of our bibliography and appendix 1, 2, 3, the transcripts from the 
interviews.  
 
Limitations  
 
 
 
 
13 
 
 
 
During the process of writing this project, we have made reflections and considered different 
approaches, theories and methods.  
Naturally we had to limit the focus and make it as specific as possible. The theories of Keyens 
and Friedman are both very extensive, which means that we had to narrow it down significantly. 
Thereby we can say that even with the amount of knowledge gained in regards to our project it is 
not nearly adequate enough.  
 
Another limitation is regarding our interviews. Initially we wanted to conduct a couple of more 
interviews inter alia with somebody from Finansiel stabilitet. Unfortunately they rejected having 
an interview with us due to a lack of specification in their opinion. We also considered including 
the Game theory. However, after having studied the theory briefly we found Principal/Agent 
more suitable to the whole board vs. CEO, CEO/Board vs. Stockholders in terms of hidden 
information, moral hazards etc. Limitations of timeline in RB chapter. We have decided to 
briefly touch upon the history before the crisis in order to get a full understanding of the bank. 
We stop our timeline when the bank ceases to exist, in order for not to investigate into what 
happened when it was declared bankrupt and split up. We think that would have been too much 
for our project, besides from irrelevant. We also thought it to be too extensive to analyze deep 
into Finanstilsynet many injunctions, as they did not lead to any conclusions nor tangible change 
of course of RB fatal destiny. 
 
Methodology 
 
Type of methods: 
 
When choosing our methods, some steps are to be followed in order to carry out a mixed 
methods research. As seen on the figure below, conducting a mixed methods requires a lot of 
 
 
 
 
14 
 
 
work and preparation. The explanation will be divided into steps in order to clearly and generally 
define each step of our methods. 
 
 
 
 
Step 1: Determine whether a mixed design is appropriate. 
 
In our project, since both qualitative and quantitative approaches will be used, this project will 
take the form of a mixed-methods research. Qualitative data in regard to our project, will focus 
on interviews and books used for the theory analysis, on the other hand, quantitative data will be 
achieved by looking at numerical data which will be taken from the annual reports from Roskilde 
Bank. 
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Those two types of data will back up what is stated in the used theories and interviews. In our 
case it will be useful to adopt a combination of qualitative and quantitative approach; it will then 
allow us to back up information obtained from numerical sources with the information obtained 
from primary sources (interviews). Mixed methods focuses on collecting, analyzing and mixing 
both quantitative and qualitative data in a single study, which in our case is the bank’s 
bankruptcy. We do believe that we can best answer the research questions through the use of 
mixed research. 
 
Step 2: Determine the rationale for using a mixed design. 
 
Bryman identified many different ways in which quantitative and qualitative data could be 
merged in mixed methods. (Bryman, 2012, page 97)  One of the types which methods could be 
merged, according to Bryman, is called the “credibility” way of mixing quantitative and 
qualitative data. “Credibility refers to suggestions that employing both approaches enhances the 
integrity of findings.”  (Bryman, 2012, page 97) We will merge our qualitative data with our 
quantitative data in order to gain credibility among audiences. 
 
 
 
Step 3: Select a mixed methods research design. 
 
In our project we will use the case study because it “allows investigators to retain the holistic and 
meaningful characteristics of real – life events – such as individual life cycles, organizational and 
managerial process neighborhood change, international relations and the maturation of 
industries.” (Yin, 2002, p. 2) So it is not surprising that case study can help us understand 
complex business or economical phenomena’s, in which the structure of given industry or the 
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economy of the company may be investigated by using a case study method. (Yin, 2002, p. 1) In 
our case we are doing a case study of Roskilde Bank and try to understand why it went bankrupt. 
 
Step 4: Collect the data 
 
In our project we will be using semi-structured interviews as a way of collecting primary data. 
We are using this type of interview in order to gather qualitative information. Semi-structured 
interviews are appropriate if working with small samples and are very useful for studying precise 
situations or simply to add and validate information resulting from other sources. 
 
They provides us with observations and opinions from different angles, they are very effective 
for gaining understanding into problems. We have interviewed two different persons, with two 
different perspectives in order to gain knowledge that may differ from one person to the other. 
Both of them have an important link to Roskilde Bank. Secondary data will also be collected, it 
will focus on the Roskilde Bank’s annual reports and hope we can add and/or validate 
information given by the two interviewees. 
 
Step 5: Analyze the data. 
 
Once the interviews have been carried out, there are two basic steps to follow in order to be able 
to analyze the data: 
 
·         Data Entry and Storage: As researchers we had to transcript our interviews, which we 
carried out in Danish. Both the interviews from Ole Nielsen, Anonymous Worker at 
Roskilde Bank and Jesper Jespersen have been completely transcribed.  
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It gives the advantages of been able to check upon written documents and to organize our 
data in a simple and efficient way. It is a process which takes time, but is necessary in 
order to get to step 2 of analyzing the data. 
 
·         Coding and Developing Category Systems: Once the transcript is done, comes the part 
where you carefully read your transcribed data, and divide the data into meaningful 
analytical units. When a meaningful segment is perceived it has to be coded. Every time 
there is something of interest for our project, there is a code to be assigned. In order to 
keep track of the codes it is important to have a master list. 
 
Step 6: Validate the data. 
 
By using a combination of methods, researchers attempt to counteract the biases that are 
associated with single-method studies. In order to find effective strategies that can be used to 
help us obtain high qualitative research validity we have chosen to go with the internal validity. 
More specifically we will use the data triangulation. 
 
Data triangulation involves using different sources of information in order to increase the 
validity of a study it works in the way that we use multiple data sources, such as our interviews 
with different people which will then makes us able to interpret the data gathered in a more 
accurate way. In our example, these sources come from: Ole Nielsen a former shareholder at 
Roskilde Bank, Finn Jørgensen a former worker at Roskilde Bank and Jesper Jespersen a 
professor in economics. During the analysis stage, feedback from the shareholder would be 
compared to the worker at Roskilde Bank to determine areas of agreement as well as areas of 
divergence. 
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Step 7: Interpret the data. 
 
Data interpretation is something that takes place from the moment we entered the field and 
collected data and it continues all the way to the end of the research study. A couple of strategies 
to use during data interpretation are reflexivity (i.e., which involves self-awareness and critical 
self-reflection by the researcher on his or her potential biases and predispositions as these may 
affect the research process and conclusions). 
 
Step 8: Write the research report. 
 
Once the data is collected and analyzed it is time to discuss the results and relate them to 
quantitative and qualitative parts our research study to make sense of the overall study and to get 
the most out of the strengths of the mixed research. 
 
Our Quantitative Data: 
 
Quantitative data consists of those samples that can be analyzed in terms of numbers.  (Bryman, 
2012, page 160) In a quantitative research, “the researcher is usually concerned to be able to say 
that his findings can be generalized beyond the confines of the particular context in which the 
research was conducted.”  (Bryman, 2012. Page 177) We will use data from the Annual Reports 
in order to get some kind of quantitative data which could later be supported by our qualitative 
data. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
19 
 
 
 
Qualitative Data: 
 
Qualitative research on the other hand describes events, persons and scientific observations 
without the use of numerical data. Qualitative methods, such as interviews, provide a ‘deeper’ 
understanding of social phenomena than would be obtained from purely quantitative methods, 
such as questionnaires. Choosing to do interviews are, therefore, most appropriate where little is 
already known about the study phenomenon or where detailed insights are required from 
individual participants. They are also particularly appropriate for exploring sensitive topics, 
where participants may not want to talk about such issues in a group environment. 
 
We will use qualitative data by looking at written documents such as the written reports from the 
Financial Stability Group. Our research will also look at books when looking at the differences 
between Keynes and Friedman. 
 
Interviews: 
 
The interviews will be aimed at an Anonymous former employee of Roskilde Bank, to Ole 
Nielsen former Investor in Roskilde Bank and to Jesper Jespersen economic professor at 
Roskilde University. We have tried, without any success, to get an interview with a worker from 
the Financial Stability Group in order to get some more general information about the whole 
situation. Our interviews will have the form of semi-structured interviews. 
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Date of Interview Name Profile Duration of 
the interview 
Info about the 
interview 
Wednesday 15th 
May 2013 at 
09:45 hr 
Ole Nielsen Former Investor at 
Roskilde Bank 
80 min Face to Face interview 
in Danish, recorded 
with mobile phone 
Wednesday 22th 
May 2013 at 
13:00 hr 
Anonymous  Former Employee 
at Roskilde Bank 
40 min Face to Face interview 
in Danish, recorded 
with mobile phone 
Monday 27th June 
at 10:55 hr 
Jesper 
Jespersen 
Professor in 
Economics at 
Roskilde University 
25 min Face to Face interview 
in Danish, recorded 
with mobile phone 
 
The purpose of these interviews is to discover the interpretations, understandings, opinions and 
reasons of individuals on a specific subject, which in our case is reasons for the Roskilde Bank 
failure. Semi-structured interviews contain key questions that help to define the areas to be 
explored, but also allows us to deviate in order to pursue an idea or response in more detail. We 
will do this in order to be able to ask some planned question and then be able to follow up with 
some other questions which aren’t planned. 
We will be able to vary the order of the questions and it also gives us the ability to ask further 
questions based in response to what might be seen as a significant reply by one of the 
interviewed. 
 
According to Steinar Kvale during a qualitative interview you can gain knowledge in two ways: 
knowledge collection and knowledge construction. (Kvale: 2009: 48). As a way to illustrate the 
two approaches Steiner Kvale presents two different metaphors called the miner and the traveller 
(ibid).  
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The two types of approaches differ in their view on knowledge: the miner views knowledge as 
something that can be uncovered which means that it is already existing and thereby it only 
needs to be collected. Kvale means that the miner seeks to unfold the unconsciousness layers and 
that the interviewer obviously will influence the outcome because he has formulated the 
questions for the interviews.  
Opposing does the traveller on the other hand view knowledge as something constructed by the 
interaction between people. The knowledge gained by the traveller during the interview/ in the 
interaction will often be marked by the traveller’s own interpretations (ibid). In our project we 
have chosen to focus on the theory of critical realism and therefore we find the ‘miner’ approach 
essential as a tool for our qualitative method.  
Interview Guide 
 
After selecting our informants we have prepared an interview guide. The intention with the 
interview guide is to make a frame for the interview. The interview guide will also work as a tool 
for the interviewer. The guide is semi-structured because the informants should have the 
opportunity to express their views and reflect upon the questions asked. But on the other hand we 
wish to keep the focus on the area of investigation. We chose to have three different informants 
and had an aim for each interview. For our first interviews, we have divided our questions into 
two categories. The first five question aims to unfold the informant’s personal opinions about the 
case of Roskilde bank. They are formulated as following:  
 
1) Why did you choose Roskilde Bank to invest in RB? (Any special reason? Any offer which 
might have interested you at the time? Why?) 
 
2) How would you describe the atmosphere during the hard years in Roskilde Bank? (Late 2007 - 
2008) Compared to previous years? 
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3) At what time did you realize something was wrong with RB and that your investment might be 
at risk? What did you think at that time?  
 
4) Do you think that Finanstilsynet did their job adequately or should they have responded more 
consequently on the injuctions that were not complied with?  
 
5) How come did the National bank not cover the losses of the stockholders?  
 
The second category aims to shed light upon the events that led up to and caused the bankruptcy 
of Roskilde bank. Here we aim to collect general knowledge about our case. The questions are 
formulated as followed:  
 
1) How was the state of Roskilde Bank before it went bankrupt?  
 
2) Roskilde Bank has been discussed many times on the news, but what is your personal opinion 
about this case? Why do you personally think it went bankrupt? Explain?  
 
3) How did this bankruptcy affect the general view of the banking system in Denmark?  
 
4) Was there any special measure adopted by the other banks after Roskilde Bank went bankrupt?  
 
5) Do you think that the bankruptcy situation could have been avoided? How?  
 
6) Do you think that the board was qualified enough for executing their work?  
 
7) Do you think that the board was fully aware of what was going on in the bank, in line with 
what a board is expected to know about its concrete business?  
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8) Should members of the board have been held accountable for what happened?  
 
9) Has the right people been held accountable for what happened in RB?  
  
The questions are semi-open, which means that our informants have the opportunity to tell 
whatever they find interesting within this question-area. This gives us an in-sight in their 
associations according to the question.  
 
The second informant we have chosen to interview wishes to be anonymous. He was a long time 
employee of Roskilde bank and represents another angle to the case than our first informant. Ole 
Nielsen was an investor in the bank while our second informant was simply an employee and 
therefore they have two different perspectives on the events.  Our third informant was Jesper 
Jespersen who is a professor in economics and has a great knowledge about Friedman and 
Keynes.  
 
Coding Qualitative data 
 
When analyzing the interviews different codes have been drawn out in order to clearly identify 
diverse parts. When come across any of these topics through the interview they will be 
highlighted in order to ease up the access for further use of data throughout the project. 
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Categories Used:  
 
A. Keynes/Minsky:  
B. Friedman 
C. Principal Agent:  1.Stockholders – Board/Directors 
                                        2.Directors – Board 
                                       3. Directors/Executives – Employees 
                                       4. Employees –  
D. Real-Estate Exposure 
E. 1.Board: Inefficiency  
                            2.Too Friendly 
                           3.Attempt to change course 
F. Quantitative  
G. Aggressive sales methods 
H. Roskilde Bank Atmosphere 
1.Employees 
2.Stockholders 
 
 
Incentive to interview Ole Nielsen: 
 
The reason behind interviewing Ole Nielsen was to get a broader knowledge of what happened 
leading up to the bankruptcy, and discovering how the course had been, seen from the 
stockholders point of view. Furthermore Ole Nielsen´s position as the chairman of the 
organization of stockholders against RB, had given us the impression that this was a guy who 
had extensive knowledge of what was going on.  
 
 Motives behind interviewing anonymous worker: 
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 He is a long time employee of RB, and later Amagerbank. Jørgensen a former Deputy Manager 
in the investment department in RB, also seemed like a relevant choice of informant. During his 
20 years in RB, he got extensive knowledge of how the bank was run. He himself was managing 
the investment portfolios of 300 customers diversifying about 250 million kroner on investments 
on their behalf. It was also expected that someone with 30 years of experience from the Danish 
banking sector would have knowledge when it comes to the deregulation happened since the 
early seventies. 
 
Motives behind interviewing Jesper Jespersen:  
 
Jesper Jespersen is professor of economics at Roskilde University and has a great knowledge 
about Keynes and Friedman. Has a researcher in pro-keynesian macro-economics he seemed like 
a relevant choice to carry out an interview focused and those two topics. He helped us in gaining 
both a specific and broad overview over the selected themes. The relation between Keynes and 
Friedman became clearer as we advanced through the interview. 
 
 
Carrying out the interview: 
 
Both of the interviews we did were face-to-face interviews which requires from us to meet with 
the interviewee. Both of the interviewees where given the opportunity to choose a place which 
they would like to be interviewed in, as both of them live in Roskilde they both decided to come 
to Roskilde University and be interviewed. We chose to do a face to face interview instead of a 
phone interview because it allows us as interviewers, to directly react to each other's answers and 
questions and it builds up confidence between the two parties. The answers we got were 
immediate and they did not allow for the interviewee to reflect extensively (Kvale, 2008). 
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 We started out with an opening question and let the interviewers talk for as long as they wanted, 
just to make them fell comfortable and in that way they got introduced to our topic. Based on the 
answer we got, we had to skip and add some questions which were not planned in order to follow 
up the conversation. 
 
We chose those two persons because they were privileged witnesses, or people who, because of 
their position, activities or responsibilities, have a good understanding of the problem facing 
Roskilde Bank. We knew that their knowledge about the Roskilde Bank situation was very broad 
as they both had been in touch with Roskilde Bank for many years. 
 
We decided not to send the questions before the interview, instead, we introduce ourselves to the 
respondent and then reminded them of the goals and projected length and the topics to be 
discussed. Contact was established both by phone and by emails, which established a bond with 
the participants prior to the interview. It is important to establish a connection prior and post 
interview, as this can also have a positive effect on the following development of the interview 
and the project. 
 
Reliability and Validity of Interview Knowledge: 
 
Naturally, there are limitations in our way of going about this project. Firstly one could argue 
that our choice of only one case might not be representative enough to draw any general 
conclusions about our field of investigation. One could perhaps have chosen several banks and 
thereafter compared the outcome of the different interviews, then outline possible tendencies or 
differences. But due to time limitation we found it a bit too ambitious to make a project so 
comprehensive. 
 
When collecting empirical data through interviews, the concepts of reliability and validity arise. 
These terms are always crucial for the construction of knowledge in interviews and later on in 
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the project. But firstly, these terms must be detailed; reliability implies to the trustworthiness of 
research findings and validity refers to truth and correctness of a statement. (Kvale: 2009: 246) 
 
Philosophy of Social Sciences: 
 
Ontology: Ontology is basically whether social entities should be considered objective entities 
that have a reality to external to social factors or if they should be considered as social 
constructions built up from actions from social actors. (Bryman,2012,pp 32-33) In our project we 
do emphasize the active role of individuals in the social construction of social reality therefore 
the ontological position we will use for our project, is the idea of constructionism. 
Constructionism thinks that social actors have a role in the making of organizations and culture. 
(Bryman,2012,pp33) 
 
Epistemology: Epistemology looks at whether the social world can or should be studied 
according to the same principles as the natural sciences. (Bryman,2012,pp27) One of the 
opposing schools, positivists, often discusses that the scientists’ conceptualization of reality 
actually reflects that reality. Critical realists on the other hand argue that the scientist’s 
conceptualization is a way of knowing that reality. For example, Kopinak (1999) explained that 
qualitative data obtained from interviews, could verify findings from quantitative data  in a 
mixed-method study. In our case we will back up the quantitative data which are the annual 
reports, with the interviews. This approach makes sense in a critical realist perspective, as it is 
based on the assumption that there is a tangible social reality. In a research, data is compared in 
order to enhance the reliability and validity of the findings. 
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Background of Roskilde Bank 
 
Roskilde bank (RB) first opened its doors in 1884, in the renowned Hotel Prindsen where the 
bank had rented some rooms. A headquarter is built in 1915 on the opposite side of the road, 
which is now the pedestrian shopping street of Roskilde. This headquarter served until RB closed 
down from bankruptcy in August 2008. 
 
The history of  RB in its first years does not differ much from the story of any other middle sized 
province bank. RB was a well built bank, managed and created by local businessmen, finding 
clients amongst the local Roskilde people. Until Niels Valentin Hansen was appointed as the 
CEO in 1978, RB was managed in a conservative economical perspective, growth was 
continuous with no big risks taken.  
 
N. Hansen was CEO of RB from 1978 until March 2007. In his time as the head of the bank he 
managed to make the bank flourish almost beyond imagination. The bank went from being a 
local bank with one headquarter to ranking as Denmark’s eight biggest bank with 22 branches 
successfully seeking funds internationally, and delivering one yearly profit better than the last. N. 
Hansen delievered 13 consecutive record result for RB, adding the value of the bank from 25 
million DK in 1978 to 7 billion in 2007 (b.dk:2008) 
 
Much of the bank’s rapid success and expansive growth came from its involvement with the Real 
Estate market, which at that time flourished just like the bank’s status for a good decade. It is 
assumed that one of the main reasons, if not the core reason, for Roskilde Bank’s pitfall occurred 
in 2008. That year both the Real Estate market and RB took a big hit from the global financial 
recession often associated with the real estate crisis in the US and the Lehman Brothers 
bankruptcy in September 2008. 
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RB took unprecedented and unconventional methods in trying to secure the growth of the bank. 
These measures were often defamed by experts. For instance, when the bank had liquidity 
problems, RB bankers made it mandatory to buy stocks in the bank when taking a loan. This 
mandatory loan requirement was applicable for private as well as corporate clients. This resulted 
in many account holders going bankrupt, not because of their personal loans but because of their 
loaned stocks for Roskilde Bank. An anonymous client tells how he managed to pay back his 
100 million loan for a project through his company, but had to shut down his business and go 
personal bankrupt due to his forced loan of x million for RB stocks (Bankerot:2009). 
 
Liquidity problems in the bank was imposed and reprimanded by Finanstilsynet (FT) with whom 
N. Hansen, CEO of the bank had a tense relationship with. More than a few times over the years 
FT drew attention to Roskilde Bank´s liquidity problem. This resulted in the bank’s  tactic to sell 
more of its stocks in order to create liquidity necessary to meet the standards set out by the 
National Bank. 
 
Through his work in RB, N. Hansen proved to be a very strong leader, staying firm to his 
decisions and making sure not to give his board too much influence. This was done among other 
things, in 1986 to cut down the frequency of board meetings from two times to once a month. 
Another way to portray his dominant leadership and his clever strategy to secure his decisions 
are not overruled was to form allies in the board by appointing his personal friends as members. 
It was evident that mere qualifications was not the priority requirement for assigning the new 
board members, rather it had more to do with who they were and who they knew. 
 
One example is Jens Winther, appointed for board member in 1990 and later Chairman of the 
board, he is a long time personal friend of N. Hansen. J. Winther was seen as a problematic 
chairman as he was a risky client. He is considered a liability to the bank himself, having had 
large amounts of significant loans in RB. This came to an extent where FT had to warn the bank 
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about him due to his loans. (Jeppesen, 2008:72) A source working in the bank at the time, calls it 
”wise” of Niels Valentin to appoint Jens Winther as the Chairman. 
 
In 2005, Finanstilsynet had contacted RB about 25 injunctions. The reason to FT contacting 
Roskilde Bank was due to its rapid increase in number of loans that it has even exceeded other 
high-growing banks at that time. FT had reason to believe this was due to the banks 
concentration and focus within the real estate business.  Heavily gambling on the real estate 
business alone made the Roskilde Bank highly dependable on its interest rate, hence being 
vulnerable to fluctuation. (Jeppesen, 2009: 96 - 98) 
 
N. Hansen encouraged clients to buy shares in the bank, selling the concept that it is a good idea 
to buy shares through loan (Jeppesen, 2009: 99) 
 
N. Hansen, together with his corporate department were so eager to hand out loans that they took 
in Jørgen Flexplan Olsen. Jørgen Olsen was known in the banking world, as he and his company 
were culpable of an other banks bankruptcy during the eighties. Due to a major loss in Nigeria 
from hospital construction contracts, Jørgen Olsen´s company Flexplan had to turn the key 
around. This took down its creditor also, Kronebanken, at the time Denmark 7th biggest bank. 
(Jeppesen, 2009:101) 
 
A business investor and entrepreneur who had single-handed been the very reason for a big 
Danish banks failure, a bank of 320.000 clients who´s actives in the bank had been saved by the 
Danish government was able to walk into RB and borrow more than 700 million kroner. Not 
only did RB willingly lend him this massive amount, they also did not accept the 15 million he 
had brought to the meeting as collateral, RB did not take collateral in the investment property he 
was borrowing for either, they only wanted 25% of the turnover if any, according to Jørgen 
Olsen. (”Bankerot”:2009) 
 
 
 
 
 
31 
 
 
It was a normal procedure than loans were easily given to what would be considered high risk 
investors. Amongst them was Jørgen Olsen, but there were also a few more examples in clients 
like Sten Gude and Kenneth Schwartz Thomsen. N. Hansen said that in order to operate at the 
Real Estate market the employees of the bank had to act fast, with no necessary paperwork done. 
So the loans were granted, and later presented to the board for after appropriation. Almost 90 % 
of the credit cases that was presented to the board were after appropriations. (Jeppesen, 2008: 
107) 
 
When Asger Mardahl-Hansen entered the board in RB he was met by a speech from N. Hansen, 
suggesting that people with a professional background related to banking were not needed or 
welcomed in the board of RB. A. Mardahl-Hansen was a former CEO of an insurance company 
called TRYG. N. Hansen seem to not have thought it was necessary for the board to have 
experienced and skilled bank people. N. Hansen believed the members of the board should not 
interfere in the more complex issues of the banking business, and that it could be of direct 
disadvantage for the business having expertise in the board (Jeppesen, 2009: 111 – 112). 
A. Mardahl-Hansen discovered that almost all of the corporate engagement was within the real 
estate sector, and approximately 40% of the banks entire loan engagements were within the same 
sector. 
 
Jeppesen explains on page 115 for the comparatively big bonus option that was awaiting N. 
hansen: in August 2006 had N. Hansen stock option program reached at staggering high of 115 
million kroner, compared to Danske Bank´s CEO´s stock option of 25 million, taking into 
account that Danske Banks earning were 37 times bigger. (Jeppesen, 2009: 114-115) 
 
In February 2006 FT sent out messages to all the banks in the Denmark, saying that the risk of a 
bubble in the real-estate market were very likely. FT asked the banks to show much care when 
assessing their capital needs. (Jeppesen, 2009: 116) 
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December 2006 RB were in capital needs and sold out of its own shares for a 3 figure million 
amount, these shares were sold amongst the banks corporate customers as well RB sold shares 
for 256 million kroner to Icelandic bank, Glitnir. The board were not aware of the capital deficit 
in the bank, and was according to Morten Jeppesen (2009: 120) only informed about the sale of 
stocks to Glitnir. Which N. Hansen by the way explained, to be a strategic move from Glitnir, 
and not as something Roskilde Bank did to rectify its capital needs. This transaction did never 
push through, due to disagreements between Niels Valentin and Glitnir, supposedly Valentin had 
promised the Icelandic bank more power and access to decision/making in RB, than he could or 
wanted to keep. 
 
When analyzing the financial statements of 2006 from Roskilde Bank it is very obvious that RB 
had had a great deal of success, or at least that its strategy of expansion had materialized. 
Jeppesen notes (pp:126) how the LFAR (Long Form Audit Report) stated that lending rate had 
gone up 59 percent from 2005 to 2006.  It also stated the footwork connected to lending the 
money were not sufficiently carried out. There was a lack of resources in the credit department, 
resulting in the paper-work and examination of the loans, not to be done properly. 
 
In extension of this LFAR, Assistant  Director Allan H. Christensen suggest employing a deputy 
manager to clean up the administrative mess in the Corporate and Credit department, someone 
who could make sure the procedures were adhered to. Both Lars Jensen and NVH refused this 
suggestion (Jeppesen: 127) 
 
From 2000 – 2007 the RB´s total lending to the real estate speculators had doubled fifteen times. 
 It went from 1 billion kroner i 2000 to a staggering 15,6 billions seven years later in 2007. Total 
stock value of RB was 7 billion kroner. 
 
NVH ends his reign in RB on March 30, 2007. According to Finn Jørgensen many customers had 
decided on beforehand that they would end their connections to RB and sell their shares by the 
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time Niels Valentin would leave the bank. By February 2008, 1,5 billion Danish kroner had been 
withdrawn from the bank and the stock were not at a staggering low of 260. Whether the 
withdrawal of the money had any connection to what Finn Jørgensen said would only be 
speculation. But the stock had continuously fallen throughout 2007 from 657 to 323. (Jeppesen, 
2008: 144). At the general assembly Chairman Peter Müller also confirms that the bank is not in 
any trouble, as 
 
”the management and the dedicated employees are doing everything, that they are capable of to 
continously to create good economical results, which will have a positive impact on stock 
value”, 
 
this despite he continues, of the current dire state of the financial corporations. He also explains 
that there is no risk connected to RB, and in general he is comforting the stockholders that 
nothing bad will happen, and the good times will shortly return. 
Placed amongst the top 100 workplaces in Europe, measured on the satisfaction of the 
employees. The rating was carried out by Financial Times in cooperation with the Great Place to 
Work Institute.  
 
SKA joined RB on July 1, 2007 as new CEO. FT had called him and Peter Müller for a meeting 
on July 4. Henrik Bjerre-Nielsen, at that time CEO of FT wanted to point out 4 things: 
 
1)   The many injunctions against RB 
2)    The heavy exposure towards the real-estate market 
3)   The many after appropriations in RB board 
4)   And the massive sale of stocks in december 2006  
 
This is when SKA discovers that the state of the bank he is now the head of, is in a dire situation 
and not as he had been promised nor expected. Board minutes are hand written, extremely short, 
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in only one copy often giving a hard time finding out what had really happened at the board 
meetings. (Jeppesen: 135) 
 
SKA also notes how the stock value seems to be the most important for the employees. SKA 
being of the opinion that the stock value is one thing, and the company strategy is another. In RB 
it seemed that strategy was stock value. 
 
As one of his first tasks, Søren K. Andersen terminates the selling of stocks to the banks own 
customers. A before mentioned widely used strategy to sell out of the stocks in hard times, or 
when needed. It is now common knowledge and correct mannered banking not to suggest a client 
to buy stocks from the clients own bank (Nielsen, Ole) SKA found it unethical to do so. 
Interim financial statement was presented on August 9, 2007. Presenting a historical profit of 405 
million Danish kroner corresponding to a raise of 76 percent. 69 million more that it was 
budgeted. 
 
Letter from FT (PP 138), September 19, 2007. RB had a raise of 50,9 percentage in loan 
engagement from June 2006 to June 2007. Average loan engagement for same period amongst 
other Danish banks were 24 percentage. FT made RB aware at the same time that its total loan 
engagement were double its deposit. 
End 2007 the total stock value had fallen 33 %, from 7,8 billion kroner to 5,2 billion kroner. 
Carsten Holdum economist from The Danish Consumer council (forbrugerrådet), calls it 
unethical to recommend its own customers to buy stocks, and urged the customers to press 
charges on RB based on the drop in the share value. (pp 138 - 139) 
 
October 12, FT contacts RB again, this time FT wants to establish how much liquidity is needed 
in RB, same procedure as in 2006. FT informed at the time, that they would also look into the 
credit management in the major cases, RB´s credit risk management in the property sector, the 
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bank´s selection of information in the weak commitments, which had been reported to the FT 
and last the liquidity of the bank ( Jeppesen: 140) 
 
This wake-up call makes SKA decide to implement a variety of changes into the organization, he 
presents his plan in November 2007, naming it ”Strategy 2010”. However this seems to be too 
late for changing the course of the bank. FT presents the result of the investigation that was 
betoken in October. And additional 8 % of liquidity was needed for the bank to carry on, 
corresponding to 1,2 billion kroner. The investigation also concluded what had been concluded 
many times before, lessen the after-appropriations and do sufficient control procedures, making 
it possible to reveal when there was an objective indication of impairment. Also FT noted that on 
two points there were considerable risks taken:  
 
1) RB accepting unfinished real estate projects as collateral and  
 
2) Too few risk evaluations had been assessed connected to the appropriations. 
 
According to Jeppsen, this is when SKA and the board finally realizes that something is gravely 
wrong in the bank. 
 
Last meeting for the stockholders are held on February 27, 2008. This meeting were formerly 
referred to as the town´s party, due to the excitement and very festivitive ambience thats was 
normally the case during these meetings. SKA surprises the board members in a meeting 
previous to the town´s party by telling them that the liquidity of the bank was critical. Since 
newyear RB clients had withdrawn 1,5 billion kroner from the bank, causing the stock value to 
go down to 260. 
 
As before mentioned RB had gone through some rough times with too little liquidity and former 
CEO Niels Valentin had had an ongoing battle with FT throughout the years. 
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Søren K Andersen had a different approach and relationship to FT than his predecessor, and he 
was now trying his best to save the bank. But there was no way to go about that the bank was not 
in a good condition. Despite this ongoing difficulties in the bank, RB was still awarded as ”A 
Great Place To Work”, amongst the nine best workplaces in Europe with over 500 employees. 
Jeppesen, 2008: 149) 
 
Next time RB receives big news from the international arena it is of much less positive sort. On 
July 1, Moody´s announces that they are downgrading the credit assessment of RB. Moody´s are 
concerned about RB´s exposure to the estate market as well as the weakening of the banks assets. 
It was Moody´s who years earlier helped the bank to get international success in the European 
financial market by succes grading them, who now brought RB back to earth. Three days later 
yet another downgrade from Moody´s lowered the stock further 6 % to 153. (Jeppesen, 2008: 
153) 
 
At this time the banks CEO realizes there is no way back. Together with his Chairman of the 
board he contacts the FT, who passes the news to the Secretary of Finance (Økonomi og 
Erhversminister) Bendt Bendtsen. It is decided that FT are approved to help the bank finding a 
solution. 
 
This results in the Nationalbank putting up a liquidity guarantee. The condition of the National 
Bank to come up with the liquidity guarantee was for RB to solvent. The plan was to sell the 
bank, either as one big bank or break it up into pieces and sell the differents parts one by one. It 
was hoped that the 21 branches with more than 100.000 private clients would cash in a lot of 
money. 
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On a board meeting on August 22 the members are informed by external unbiased accountants 
from KPMG that the bank is insolvent, losses from the first part of the year 2008 are now 
estimated to be between 2 and 2 and a half billion kroner, result of the interim financial report. 
The board are also informed that no buyers have shown interest. (Jeppesen, 2008: 18).  
 
Customers were categorized as red and green customers. Green customers were the economical 
healthy customers, the customers that RB had expected would be a potential bargaining power 
when selling the bank. Red customers were the risky clients, with big loan engagement in the 
bank. Many of the real-estate speculators. On the red list 79 clients were represented all together, 
summoning up a loan engagement of 16,8 billion kroner. (Jeppesen, 2008: 13) 
 
The CEO was during these days negotiating the future of RB with the National Bank. As the 
bank did no longer comply with the law of liquidity the National bank and Det Private Beredskab 
took over RB.  
 
Theories 
 
1st part: 
 
Keynes’s monetary theory of interest 
 
Keynes view was basically that the economic policies of the time had expired and needed to be 
refreshed so they were more time relevant and in the same way Minsky uses Keynes theories and 
builds on them to make them more relevant and precise. “Keynes was the first who talks about 
monetary theory of production, where there previously was spoken of real theory of production. 
He breaks down from traditional thinking.” – (translated directly from Danish interview with 
Jesper Jespersen). 
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 This is the theory which the main focus in on the controlling all the areas in the banking industry 
from financial sector until the market. With the main focus on the regulation of the market and 
the governments control of the financial sector. 
 
The theory and practice of debt management policy: 
 
In order to understand this concept of debt management there is first the need to understand what 
“The Funding Complex” means and entails. The funding complex originated in a condition 
where three certain factors were central:  
(a) When there was a fixed fiduciary issue, 
(b) Bank rate was the means of preserving the balance of payments, 
(c) The rate of interest was used as an instrument of deflation. (Tily page 70) 
In the theory Keynes takes the “funding complex” and contrasts it to the optimal position, this is 
the conventional debt management policy. In this contrast Keynes names the longer-dated debt 
as “funds”, which is described as the authorities’ favored way of funding, thereby limiting the 
supply of shorter-dated debt, which he called “counter-liquidity preference”.  
 
In accordance with the theory of liquidity preference, the problematic issue with the funding is 
the public. The public did not have a high enough preference for illiquidity, as the governments’ 
favoritism for long term borrowing. In order to change the public’s preferences the rates on long-
term debt would need to be higher thus this would lead the public to be more prone to accept 
long-term issues.“Under such circumstances “it is the public which sets the rate of interest” – 
and it was not possible for the authorities to bring the rate of interest under control.”1 Within 
this policy there is a malicious circle that causes a great deal of problems, this is if the long-term 
interest rate is raised to positively influence the publics’ preferences, it would simultaneously 
raise expectations from the public that interest rate continues to rise. 
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Thus this would lead to a need for a cheap money policy, but in order for this to be possible then 
the “funding complex” must be discarded. The reason for this Keynes explains is point a) and b) 
in the funding complex is connecting to the gold standard, but that had become outdated so they 
were now irrelevant. As for c) the reason for its irrelevance is in Keynes wider theory he 
disproves this point. Two aspects in particularly aid in disproving it, first the mechanism through 
which deflationary monetary policy functioned was to decrease the demand and thereby also the 
amount of employment. The second point is the fact that the use of the bank rate was inconsistent 
in connection with policy of cheap money. When considering the dismissal of the “funding 
complex”, the essential issue was to develop a debt management technique that enabled the 
public’s liquidity would remain as they desired. 
 
The solution that Keynes described would provide answers for these issues, is something he 
called “the tap issue”. The policy it provided would be for the Government to set the price and 
maturity of a bond that is available, but simultaneously not set a fixed cash limit to the issue. The 
function of the “tap issue” is to make it possible for individuals and institutions to purchase 
amounts of the bond whenever and whatever quantities they wanted. This system made it 
possible for public, be it institutions or individuals, to choose the quantity of debt issued at each 
degree of liquidity, but still with Government in control of which price is would be set at. “The 
second aspect of Keynes’s debt management policy was to extend the degrees of liquidity 
available by issuing a wider range of securities.” (Tily, page 71) 
 
By developing these different policy’s they served to provide for the medium-term as well as 
longer-term savings necessary requirements. “The offer of extended facilities further relieved 
pressure arising from the desire for precautionary holdings of wealth as money and served to 
create a more balanced portfolio of asset holdings.” (Tily,page 71) Thereby looking at this from 
a macroeconomic point of view, the concept of lessening the returns to capital implies that the 
yield on aggregate capital expenditure will be reduced over time.“With the rate of interest 
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governing the volume of capital expenditure, a monetary policy aimed at stable and high 
employment would, therefore, have to be managed at not only low but also falling rates of 
interest.” (Tily) Then by looking at this from the point of view of debt management, it was vital 
to understand that any long bond issued would not be deprioritized by any later issue. Simply put 
it was important to solve the higher-interest bonds first before new lower-interest bonds were 
presented, in other words as said by Keynes “the maximum degree of flexibility and freedom for 
future policy”. (Tily) 
 
“Changes in the complex of interest rates, with a view to controlling the trade cycle and to offset 
inflationary or deflationary trends, should not be precluded, but should affect the shorter-term 
rather than the longer-term, issues, and should, as a rule be regarded as secondary to the 
technique of rationing the volume, rather than altering the terms of credit by the machinery of, 
e.g. the Capital Issues Committee by influencing the volume of bank advances.” (Tily) 
 
Monetary expansion and fiscal policy: 
 
In Keynes theory’s about expansion of expenditures in the public works the financial 
considerations played a vital role. “According to the (full) multiplier theory, government 
expenditure would increase national income and employment, hence raising taxation revenues 
and reducing benefit expenditures.” (Tily, page 72) Keynes always argued for expenditures in 
financial issues since he believed that they were self-financing. His opinion was that there was a 
major misunderstanding when it came to believing there was a dilemma between strategies to 
increase employment and strategies to balancing budget. He argued that issue is when the aim is 
to balance the budget, and then there must be an increase in employment, thus an increase in 
national income. 
 
Keynes had developed numerous systems which a large number of them displayed concerns 
about “monetizing” the government debt. Some of the main concerns were that by changing this 
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policy it could potentially cause inflation and thereby disrupting the direct link that the floating 
debt and credit creation share. “Outside banking mechanisms, any substantial increases to the 
floating debt as a result of accommodating liquidity preference for shorter-term instruments 
were due to savings not spending considerations and therefore were also not inflationary.” 
(Tily,page 73) The large risks of floating debt can be avoided and be put under control, with a 
substantial comprehension of the working of the current financial world and what possible 
outcomes it could result in, without this the floating debt can increase slowly until it reaches a 
point where it is not possible to bring under control.   
 
“Means of exchange considerations overlapped with store of value considerations – and hence 
the theory of liquidity preference – in that they were both partly dependent on a supply of liquid 
assets that was controlled by the authorities. But the former demanded a wider view of 
quantitative control and of the means to control more directly banks’ ability to create credit. The 
same liquidity constraints are then relevant to a private sector expansion of credit.” (Tily, page 
71) There are to necessary conditions to be fulfilled in order for the central bank to able to set a 
fixed rate of interest. First of it is vital that banks are supplied with cash so they can keep up with 
demand. The second point is that banks eligible assets should never be in to short a supply to 
discount at the central bank in exchange for that cash. “Both conditions are liquidity preference 
conditions: there should be an adequate supply of liquidity in the form of both cash and bills to 
support the supply of bank money.” (Tily, page 74) Although if analyzing the matters in such a 
way, it would vary from the transactions and finance demands which Keynes argued for and had 
his focus on a broader demand for bank money/active money as a whole.  
 
Minsky Moment: 
 
What cannot be refuted now is that this new economic crisis that has hit the world economy and 
which made its first appearance in the American economy, was significantly underestimated by 
economists, in particular its wide economic impact.  
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This economic crisis can be explained by a credit crunch, which is when loans and investment 
capital are difficult to obtain. When this happens it creates a condition were everybody treads 
very carefully by which financial moves they make, like banks and other various types of lenders 
permit less loans, thus borrowing prices rise, followed by it reaching a point where there are no 
deals which go through. “Economist Hyman P. Minsky (1919–1996) was the foremost expert on 
such crunches in recent years, and his ideas remain relevant to understanding the current 
situation.”  (Whalen, 2008, page 94) 
 
Economic crisis was defined as a Minsky moment, with special focus on the“financial instability 
hypothesis” and the “money manager capitalism.” The first phase of the Minsky moment is what 
can be described as a prolonged period of rapid acceleration of debt. In this phase loans are made 
in an increasing wait in order pay off existing loans, thus creating an increasing spiral of new 
debt. Then the moment reaches critical point where the debt and loans gets so high that the banks 
and lenders become even more cautious and refuse to make more loans. Thus all the risks that 
this can lead to, become very clear and if not acted upon, it can develop into a new phase, called 
the “Minsky Meltdown”, this will make asset values drop drastically setting of a recession. 
“Even without a meltdown, the jobs market can soften. The “natural response” of employers is 
to be more cautious about adding workers when financial conditions tighten.”  (Whalen, 2008, 
page 95) 
 
 
Through Minsky’s understanding of economics there were two different ways of perceiving the 
market economy or in other words business cycles, there was the “Smithian view” and the 
“Keynesian view”. “In the “Smithian” view, Minsky argued, the internal and inherent—
endogenous—processes of markets generate an economic equilibrium (either a static equilibrium 
or a growth equilibrium). In the Keynesian view, however, Minsky maintained that endogenous 
economic forces breed financial and economic instability.” (Whalen, 2008 page 95) Then with 
keeping focus on the Keynesian view it can be understood that Minsky considered that the 
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aspects of booms and busts of the market to be an inevitable part of business system. “In the 
Keynesian view, the ups and downs of the economy are a product of the internal dynamics of 
markets, and this instability is considered a genuine social problem, in part because cyclical 
downturns are seen to be associated with an increase in involuntary unemployment.” (Whalen, 
2008, page 95) 
 
To put it simply the aim with all economic theory’s and processes that are formulated is for them 
to accumulate wealth and have continued profit. No matter if it is short term or long term, 
doesn’t matter which ever view it is formulated from, the aim is always the same. This is the 
main emphasis of Minsky and Keynes economic views. Therefor the aim of these theories is to 
predict and be able to plan accordingly to future situations.  
But the future always being changing, vague and uncertain it makes it very unpredictable, thus 
nearly impossible to plan or theorize accurately. Thereby the only thing there can be done is take 
into account possible outcomes and judge which investments and judgments are most favorable, 
then hope for the best, in an very insecure market.  
 
While Minsky was working with analyzing the workings with the economy, he realized that the 
efficient-market hypothesis, was insufficient to describe the economy, he therefor developed the 
financial instability hypothesis(FIH). This theory Minsky comes suggested that the financial 
structure in the capitalist economy becomes increasingly fragile when prosperity continues over 
a long period of time. In this prolonged time of prosperity that continuously slowly builds up, 
businesses in highly profitable areas of theeconomy are substantially rewarded for continuously 
increase their debt amounts. This then leads to a problem where, these businesses success 
encourage other businesses to take similar action. “Increased profits also fuel the tendency 
toward greater indebtedness by easing lenders’ worries that new loans might go unpaid.”  
(Whalen, 2008, page 97) 
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In the FIH Minsky had a focus on an aspect called Stabilizing an Unstable Economy, which he 
described in detail the essence of it.“One of these is evolution of the economy (or a sector of the 
economy) from what he called “hedge” finance to “speculative” finance, and then in the 
direction of “Ponzi” finance. In the so-called hedge case, which has nothing to do with hedge 
funds, borrowers are able to pay back interest and principal when a loan comes due. In the 
speculative case, they can pay back only the interest and therefore must roll over the financing. 
And in the case of Ponzi finance, companies must borrow even more to make interest payments 
on their existing liabilities. A second facet of the FIH that received increasing emphasis from 
Minsky over time is its attention to lending as an innovative, profit driven business. In fact, in a 
1992 essay, Minsky wrote that bankers and other intermediaries in finance are “merchants of 
debt, who strive to innovate with regard to both the assets they acquire and the liabilities they 
market”.” (Whalen, 2008, page 97) 
 
In this phase of FIH that is continuously expanding, which has previous been described how the 
expansionary process works in it, finally reaches a point of no return which is the Minsky 
moment. The dilemma in this process are displayed with its major problems that are seen in hand 
full of high-profile companies that have overextended their capability to taking loans and no 
longer can pay them back while having profit, they then are forced to sell assets to try and 
maintain their payments. “Then, since the views of acceptable liability structures are subjective, 
the initial shortfalls of cash and forced selling of assets “can lead to quick and wide revaluations 
of desired and acceptable financial structures.”  
As Minsky writes, “Whereas experimentation with extending debt structures can go on for years 
and is a process of gradually testing the limits of the market, the revaluation of acceptable debt 
structures, when anything goes wrong, can be quite sudden”. (Whalen, 2008, page 98) 
 
If there is no intervention from government or the central bank, the Minsky moment builds up to 
a point that leads to a total collapse of the economy, which will cause asset values to plunge from 
companies being forced to sell their credit. At a certain point they will have sold so much, that 
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there is not enough to sell, therefor investments drop, output decreases drastically, and 
unemployment increases dramatically. “This is why Minsky called his FIH “a theory of the 
impact of debt on [economic] system behavior” and “a model of a capitalist economy that does 
not rely upon exogenous shocks to generate business cycles”.  (Whalen, 2008, page 98) 
 
One of Minsky’s major contributions to economic perceptions is a publication that involves 
innovation toprofit opportunities, while it displays how innovation provides business activity to 
grow and spread despite the absence of expansionary monetary policy. Minsky explained that the 
improvement of the federal funds market permitted a certain quantity of aggregate reserves to 
maintain a larger expansion of deposits. It also provides a means for repurchase agreements to be 
given quantity of demand deposits to maintain a greater volume of loans. “He also 
“endogenized” innovation, making it a function of profit-seeking behavior. As the central bank 
tightens monetary policy, this raises interest rates and encourages new financial practices that 
“stretch liquidity” as liquid balances are reduced.” (Whalen, 2008, page 98) When 
understanding this it can be seen that the firm monetary policy might not reduce the money 
supply, when higher interest rates make banks attempt to look for new directions of providing 
finance. Simultaneously these new ideas provide probable instability for the economy and 
business market because “every institutional innovation which results in both new ways to 
finance business and new substitutes for cash assets decreases the liquidity of the economy”. 
(Whalen, 2008, page 98) 
With this Minsky explained in which way early in an expansion period, the supply curve of 
credit would be highly elastic that would make it possible for rising demand for credit to not 
have a significant effect on interest rates. Although in later periods during a time of boom, as 
liquidity falls and the possibility of default increases, the supply curve becomes more inelastic in 
order for the rising demands to lift interest rates. Though this could eventually induce continued 
innovation and further fragility. Through this development it increases the chance of rapid 
deflation of value of assets should some firms not be able to live up to contracted commitments. 
“Ultimately, the monetary authorities might be called upon to halt a debt deflation process by 
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intervening as a lender of last resort to increase the quantity of liquidity by accepting (at the 
discount window) illiquid assets.” (Whalen, 2008) 
 
Minsky considered the terms “interest rate” and the “type of liability” methods that are used to 
financing investments, to be heavily influenced of the development of the monetary system. “In 
turn, both money-market conditions and the balance-sheet structure of firms affect the response 
of firms to a change in income. This can be interpreted as making the accelerator coefficient an 
endogenous variable related to the monetary system.” (Whalen, 2008)  With this line of thought 
Minsky developed 4 alternative types of monetary systems; the first is where neither velocity nor 
quantity changes, then the next one it is only the velocity changes, the third it is only the quantity 
change, and the final one is where both velocity and quantity change. With these concepts he 
demonstrated that when an expansion happens through an increase of the money supply, then the 
balance of a firm significantly decline. Although , if both velocity and the money supply will rise 
due to the expansion, “rise in velocity tends to counteract the deterioration of firms’ balance 
sheets in a business-cycle expansion financed by bank creation of money.” (Whalen, 2008) 
 
For a business to go through the process of lower their liquidity preferences, could be perceived 
as business expansion providing the possibility of being less dependent on the support of the 
banking system.  
Simultaneously if the liquidity rises when there is an economic downswing it will result in “a 
deterioration of firms’ balance sheets, inducing a further fall of investment. (Whalen, 2008) It 
can therefore be concluded that liquidity preference, money supply conditions, and aspects that 
affect velocity, all play a vital role in influencing the financial situation of firms. 
 
“Minsky (1959) reworked this model, adding “floors and ceilings” that imposed “new initial 
conditions” on the model, interpreted as “reflecting effective supply constraints”. (Minsky 1959 
pp. 133-4) He showed that the time path of income generated by such a linear accelerator model 
“can generate either (a) steady growth, (b) cycles, (c) booms, or (d) long depressions”. (Minsky 
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1959, p. 134) He demonstrated that “by feeding financial and money market developments into 
the formal model through the ratchet in the consumption function, booms and depressions of 
varying amplitude and length can be generated.” (Whalen, 2008) 
 
THE FINANCIAL INSTABILITY HYPOTHESIS: 
 
Minsky always argued that the financial systems start out as with a robust structure in which they 
then naturally develop into having a fragile structure. In other words they always start out stabile 
and then evolve into being unstable at some point. This in way actually contracts the first 
element of the financial instability hypothesis, in which it states that financial systems include 
both stabile an unstable systems simultaneously in them. Therefor it would be more accurate that 
Minsky actually states that financial systems always have an element of instability though this 
factor only increases over time. The second part of the theorem postulates that if there is a period 
with continues prosperity, then the economy will transfer from financial relations that make for a 
stable system to financial relations that make for an unstable system. 
 
“It can be shown that if hedge financing dominates, then the economy may well be an 
equilibrium seeking and containing system. In contrast, the greater the weight of speculative and 
Ponzi finance, the greater the likelihood that the economy is a deviation amplifying system. . . . 
[O]ver a protracted period of good times, capitalist economies tend to move from a financial 
structure dominated by hedge finance units to a structure in which there is large weight to units 
engaged in speculative and Ponzi finance.”  (Papadimitriou, 1997) 
 
The situation that the financial system is in is the reason behind the changes in opinions and 
positions that financial system actors have. It all depends on what seems like the most favorable 
position to be in. If the financial system is stable then things will stay as they are, but as soon as 
there seems to be a decline in the system, a change is needed thus a change in position. This 
explains when the development happens from having a robust (hedge) arrangement tofragile 
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(speculative) positions. This speculative positions are then urged toward a Ponzi point of view 
for a number of different reasons: “the terms on which finance is available become less 
favorable (either because providers become concerned with their own positions or because the 
central bank adopts tighter policy to head-off perceived inflationary pressures), some 
expectations are revised, income flows that had been expected are not forthcoming […]”.  
(Papadimitriou, 1997) 
 
During the postwar period the economic activity was a in a situation of very cautious decision 
making and use of debt. After this period there followed a long period of economic prosperity, 
which seemed to be constantly improving and continuing. This led to an attitude with in the 
financial sector of being less cautious and greater tendency to rely on loans and growing in debt. 
Thus as the reliance on debt grew the economic situation developed into an increasingly fragile 
state. If this fragile state would not be strengthen and become as robust as it once was, then the 
consequence of economic crash would be evident.  
 
“Minsky argued that “ceilings and floors” were put into place during the 1930s and in the 
immediate post-war period to successfully--thus far--prevent another debt deflation.”  
These ceilings and floors take the form of a wide variety of institutional arrangements—some 
governmental, some private; some automatic, some discretionary; some intentional and some 
fortuitous. He argued “institutions and interventions thwart the instability breeding dynamics 
that are natural to market economies by interrupting the endogenous process and “starting” the 
economy again with non-market determined values as “initial conditions”.”2 
 
In this concept of ceilings and floors the most vital part of it is: the progress of a large 
government that has the capability of running large countercyclical deficits in a relative 
comparison to the size economy. The other is the role that the central bank plays as being able to 
step in and intervene in a last resort situation. “Countercyclical deficits and surpluses allow the 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
49 
 
 
government to place ceilings and floors on aggregate demand, and, thus, profits, which helps to 
maintain business income flows in bad times (through deficits) while dampening these flows in 
booms (through fiscal surpluses).” (Papadimitriou, 1997, page 17) Likewise the central bank is 
able to create a floor on the asset prices, by providing the last resort solution of intervening to 
supply liquidity, which in turn decreases the pressure of hasty sales of assets to try to reduce 
deficit, but in turn can result in a rapid plummet of prices. Through this process, when the 
expenditure of the private sector decreases, there is automatically established a government 
deficit, which aids in maintaining aggregate demand and business gross capital income, 
providing the possibility for companies to service financial positions. 
 
This would mean that should companies arrive in a situation where they experience financial 
difficulties, the central bank step in and intervene in order to prevent further problems from 
happening and spreading. Although Minsky always emphasized that long before any such 
measures would be necessary, the “[…]the problem is that if debt deflations are eliminated, 
increasingly fragile positions can be taken with no “cleansing” (or balance sheet 
simplification)[…]” (Papadimitriou, 1997, page 16) thus preventing the necessity of them. 
Therefore it is necessary for alternative institutional arrangements to be able to be made to place 
a ceiling on the asset prices anticipations. 
 
Then by looking at this in its entirety, it offers a framework for the analysis of the modern 
economy provided by Minsky. Through the crucial features of this kind of economy a unique 
type of instability results, this is especially true with “[…] the financial arrangements that are 
necessary in a private, for-profit economy which requires expensive, long-lived capital 
assets.”3Financial instability can be controlled if suitable institutions are developed to provide 
“ceilings and floors (Papadimitriou, 1997, page 18) although it is not possible to acquire stability 
because of the presence of tranquility and the impact it applies on expectations and thus 
behavior. 
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Stabilizing the Unstable Economy: 
 
When discussing how to stabilize the unstable economy by looking at different layers of the 
system. There are four points of relevance that must be focused on: a) big government b) 
employment c) financial reform d) market power. It is though only the last two points that is of 
importance when discussing its correlation with Roskilde Bank. In accordance with the financial 
reform, as discussed previously in chapter, according to Minsky the national banks readiness to 
step in and intervene as lender of last resort affects the manner in which the financial markets 
behave. With this line of thought it can be expected that the national bank has to be willing to a 
larger responsibility for regulating financial markets. An important point of focus in this theory 
is there must be a greater reliance on prudential supervision of banks.“ Further, he favored 
policies that would tie lending to specific assets--something like a “real bills doctrine”--so that 
“the payment commitments on the debts used can be closely related to the cash flows that these 
assets are expected to yield. The financial flow relations are analogous to those that characterize 
hedge financing.” (Papadimitriou, 1997, page 17) 
 
 
2nd part 
Milton Friedman's theory of economic monetarism: 
 
 
Milton Friedman an American economist, born in 1912, was a supporter of the laissez faire-
capitalism, which refers to capitalism based on a laissez-faire principle of a free market, where 
the individuals can exchange goods and services without government interference. In his book 
“Free to choose: A personal statement”, Friedman elucidates that one should use public 
consumption and investments to stimulate the demand and hence the employment.  
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Friedman had confidence in the ability of the markets themselves to find a balance between 
supply and demand without government interference, which according to his statement would 
cause more harm than good. “Anything that prevents prices from expressing freely the conditions 
of demand or supply interferes with the transmission of accurate information....Important as 
private distortions of the price system are, these days the government is the major source of 
interference with a free market system – through tariffs and other restraints on international 
trade, domestic action fixing or affecting individual prices, including wages, government 
regulation of specific industries, monetary and fiscal policies producing erratic inflation, and 
numerous other channels.” (Friedman M. a., 1980, page 17)  Friedman explicate that to insinuate 
static, into the transmission of information through prices, is one of the extensive negative effects 
of abnormal inflation¨ He mentions that the main reason for inflation is when the quantity of 
money has increased extravagantly and therefore it is only possible to cure inflation by reducing 
the rate of monetary growth. However, there are problematic side effects to this so-called cure; 
namely a higher rate of unemployment and a slow growth in the economy. (Friedman M. a., 
1980, page 273)   
 
Friedman was convinced that the most beneficial way to radically control the money supply, like 
it is by the Federal Reserve, was through the use of a mechanical system which would keep the 
quantity of money increasing less rapidly. Although Friedman did not believe that the 
government should be involved and make strict policy rules for the market, he was open to a 
“real,” non-government, gold standard where money is produced by the private market: “A real 
gold standard is thoroughly consistent with (classical) liberal principles and I, for one, am 
entirely in favor of measures promoting its development.” On the other hand he stated the 
following: “Let me emphasize that this note is not a plea for a return to a gold standard.... I 
regard a return to a gold standard as neither desirable nor feasible—with the one exception that it 
might become feasible if the doomsday predictions of hyperinflation under our present system 
should prove correct.” (Ebeling, 1999)  Friedman explained that the reason that it was not 
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feasible was because “there is essentially no government in the world that is willing to surrender 
control over its domestic monetary policy.” However, it could be done if “you could re-establish 
a world in which government's budget accounted for 10 percent of the national income, in which 
laissez-faire reigned, in which governments did not interfere with economic activities and in 
which full employment policies had been relegated to the dustbin...”  
 
Euro-optimism  
 
Friedman's fundamental focus lies on how Western market economies are self-adjusting, active 
economic regulation only leads to disappointments and should therefore be avoided. Fluctuations 
in the level of employment is temporary, as the unemployment rate has a natural level. 
There are various theories about the reason behind the economic crisis, one of them is the 
macroeconomic theory, which basically includes the establishment of a common currency in the 
European Union (ØMU) and has led to two different sub-theories; the euro-optimism and the 
euro-realism. Friedman, who is behind euro-optimism, concludes that in a macroeconomic 
system, where perfect competition exists, and where all prices, wages and capital market interest 
rates are completely flexible and unregulated, 'by itself' creating a market equilibrium with full 
employment. With this Friedman is referring to the monetarist economic model. The balance 
includes a balance in the labor market, where wages are determined by the evolution of 
monetary, hence the name monetarism.  
 
It is therefore, according to the monetarist model, a single matter to implement economic 
policies. Equilibrium in the labor market comes by itself, if only wage formation is sufficiently 
flexible. Economic growth is determined by labor supply and the underlying productivity 
development.  The role of the central bank is therefore to ensure that the increase in money 
supply is limited. The price inflation should then be under control. (Jespersen, 2012, page 29) 
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What is special about the euro-optimistic variant of monetarism is that it assumes that Friedman's 
model will apply to all EU countries meet the convergence criteria. In this case, the individual 
countries can safely abandon their own currency in favor of a single currency. The model is the 
European Central Bank as a guarantee that the money supply is under control and market forces 
to ensure that the real economy will be in equilibrium. 
 
Here, however, I have to mention that Friedman back in the 1990s was deeply skeptical about 
whether European countries' labor markets as flexible as the monetarist model assumed. 
In Friedman's model it is just a flexible exchange rate, ensuring that countries with different 
social structures can maintain a balance in their trade.  
Friedman did not consider the convergence criteria sufficient to ensure a uniform and parallel 
wages in EU countries. Therefore, he also thought that a European central bank would face an 
impossible task in the effort to ensure a uniform inflation in participating landing. 
 
According to Jespersen, Friedman was correct when he argued that the participating countries 
did not have a uniform wage, and that in a longer time perspective would create significant 
competitive tensions between the countries. Mundells requirements for an optimal currency area, 
which as stated is based on the monetarist model was not adequately secured in the EMU Treaty 
convergence criteria. The fulfillment of the requirements was also no guarantee that the euro 
landing no later would grow apart. 
 
In addition - and it turned out quite clearly in the period after 2007 - that Friedman's equilibrium 
model for monetary stability nor had validity for landing Seen each separately. The market 
economic system is not self-righting. Unemployment began to fall after the shock of 2008/09 - 
on the contrary, it continued to increase in most countries. The euro-optimistic model is thus 
faced with a double challenge. 
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Firstly, there is a parallel development in the euro-landing. Therefore, a "one size fits all" 
economic policy is not possible. The interest rate of the European Central Bank sets will be too 
high for some member countries and too low for others. There is a lack of coherence in economic 
policy, further emphasizing the underlying differences between euro area countries as well as 
causing them to drive even farther apart. The second challenge to the theory is that the market 
economy system - not - at national level is self-righting. It is the development in the U.S. and UK 
current examples. These economies are also, even though they have their own currency in a 
situation of high unemployment. The monetary and several macroeconomic equilibrium model is 
under considerable pressure because of its ability to explain the actual development has to be 
modest. 
 
 
Free Banking 
 
Friedman also looked deeper into the free market by investigating specifically free banking, 
which was also referred to as wildcat banking. Here he mentions previous researchers and 
supporters of a free banking system, such as Lawrence H. White, Rockoff, Rolnick and Weber, 
who had reexamined the use of free banking in e.g. Scotland and The U.S. According to 
Friedman, free banking is characterized as a system with utterly free access and the slightest, if 
any, restraint or regulation provided by the government. (Friedman M. a., 1980, page 304)  
 
Originally Friedman was a supporter of Keynes and he was therefore against monetary laissez-
faire. However, after subsequent published research he revised his views upon monetary laissez-
faire. In “Government has any role” Friedman and Anna Schwartz explains the question of “free-
banking”, which is stated as the following: “Given a well-defined outside money . . . can and 
should strict laissez-faire be the rule for banking— broadly defined to include the issuance of 
inside money in the form of currency as well as deposits?”  (Selgin, Milton Friedman and the 
Case Agains Currency Monopoly, 2008)  
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Deregulation of financial firms, so that they are free to pay whatever interest is required to obtain 
funds and to charge whatever interest is bearable to borrowers, is certainly desirable on grounds 
of market efficiency. However, as Friedman and Schwartz point out, it is an open question 
whether complete deregulation, or free banking, is desirable or feasible without government 
restrictions on banking activities. It is not likely that the market itself will be able to provide a 
stable financial system. 
 
As reported by Friedman and Schwartz, the question of free-banking comprises the following 
three subordinated issues, if a public lender of last resort is imperative or desirable, if regulatory 
restrictions on lending and investing by private financial institutions are imperative or desirable, 
and if the government should have monopoly on the hand-to-hand currency. Friedman and 
Schwartz' overall concern mainly focus' on the third sub-issue. However, they argue that the last 
two subordinated-issues are not completely independent, because in order to “monopolizing the 
supply of hand-to-hand currency”, governments are obliged to limit the length of loans and 
investing which are offered by the private financial intermediaries.  
 
Friedman and Schwartz comes to the conclusion that no positive economic arguments exists to 
support government monopolies of hand-to-hand currency. However, they state that it would be 
pointless if contradicting these monopolies. “I hope to show that this conclusion is far from 
justified—that is, that the reasons for opposing official currency monopolies are at least as 
compelling as those for opposing most other statutory monopolies.” (Milton Friedman and Anna 
J. Schwartz, 1987, page 304)  Friedman and Schwartz’s divergent perspective is not vindicated 
for various purposes. “Firstly, it relies on a reading of the history of banking which, still 
understates both the advantages of freedom of note issuance and the disadvantages of chapter’s 
monopoly. Secondly, the conclusion disregards various essential theoretical advantages of 
competitively supplied paper currency. Finally, the conclusion depends on an unjustified appeal 
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to a supposedly given degree of political feasibility of radical reform”.  (Milton Friedman and 
Anna J. Schwartz, 1987, page 304) 
 
Rockoff, Rolnick and Weber, and King may well be right that wildcat banking in the first half of 
the nineteenth century was less widespread and extensive than earlier writers made it out to be. 
They may also be correct that the bank failures that occurred owed far more to the legal 
conditions imposed on bank note issues-namely, that they be “backed” by state or U.S. bonds-
and the subsequent depreciation in value of the bonds of a number of states than to irresponsible 
wildcat banking. Yet none of their evidence is directly relevant to the question of how banking 
and currency issue would have developed in the absence of state legislation.  
 
“Further, conditions have changed drastically in the past century and a half in ways that are 
particularly relevant to the question whether financial intermediaries should be prohibited from 
issuing inside money in the form of hand-to-hand currency [our point 2(a) in section 12.11. 
 We are no longer dealing with a sparsely settled country in which travel is slow and 
communication between distant points involves long delays. We now have instant 
communication and rapid means of transport. Book entries have replaced the physical transfer of 
currency or specie as the principal means of discharging monetary obligations. From being the 
primary medium of exchange, currency has become the counterpart of a minor fraction of 
aggregate transactions. Private institutions, banks and non-banks, issue inside money in the form 
of traveler’s checks redeemable on demand in outside money. (Milton Friedman and Anna J. 
Schwartz, 1987) The value of such traveler’s checks outstanding is now included in the official 
estimates of all monetary aggregates broader than the monetary base (equal to outside money). 
(Milton Friedman and Anna J. Schwartz, 1987, page 304)  However, Friedman and Schwartz 
mentions that the probability and, as important, the reality of fraud by financial businesses would 
abide, but at that time it seemed impossible to stay critical towards a hand-to-hand currency than 
deposits.  
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According to Friedman “....The final result of not recognizing the differences between a liquidity 
and a solvency crisis will doubtless be the failure or liquidation of many savings and loans that 
would have been sound and solvent in the absence of the savings and loan holiday.” (Milton 
Friedman and Anna J. Schwartz, 1987)   
These incidents, Friedman mentions, unfavourably displays that “the inherent instability”, which 
was the name for it once, of a fractional reserve banking system is still working and working 
robustly. However he also mentions that, from these incidents it does not appear is if a central 
bank or a government “lender of last resort”is compelling and attractive as a cure. At the time it 
remained as an open question. “And, whether a satisfactory cure or not, is the emergence of a 
“lender of last resort” a likely or unavoidable consequence of financial development?”  (Milton 
Friedman and Anna J. Schwartz, 1987, page 305)  
 
In a past report by Charles Goodhart, he estimated a rather broad matter of historical evidence, 
which involved the studies Friedman and Schwartz’s were implying to earlier, he basically 
establishes that the “lenders of last resort” development, in the form of central banks was a 
common and desirable evolvement arising from the typical features of a partial reserve banking 
system. The theoretical argument is straightforward and well-known.  
It rests on the distinction, already referred to, between a liquidity and solvency crisis. (Milton 
Friedman and Anna J. Schwartz, 1987, page 307) Furthermore Friedman explains that if a bank's 
or another company's responsibilities surpasses the value of its assets, the bank will have to deal 
with the issue regarding solvency. The importance of the problem is measured by the 
dissimilarities between the banks liabilities and the value of its assets. 
  
However Friedman mentions that the bank can continue as an institution if the difference 
between the two is fractional. “That difference may be a small fraction of total liabilities, perhaps 
even less than the equity of the shareholders, so that if the assets could be liquidated in an 
orderly fashion the institution could pay off all other liabilities in full or for that matter continue 
as a going institution. The special feature of a fractional-reserve bank is that the bulk of its 
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liabilities are payable on demand either by contract or usage.” (Milton Friedman and Anna J. 
Schwartz, 1987, Page 307)  However Friedman also mention that even with a fractional-reserve 
banking system, the bank will be up against the problem of liquidity in case that the depositors 
are claiming payment. Furthermore, the bank’s problem of solvency will not at all be significant 
to the same extent as its liquidity problem. “The individual bank is not able to satisfy its 
depositors unless it can in some way convert its temporarily illiquid assets into cash.”  (Milton 
Friedman and Anna J. Schwartz, 1987, page 305)  
 
Friedman observed that the problem of liquidity cannot be expected to persist limited to a single 
bank. “The difficulty of one bank gives rise to fears about others, whose depositors, not well-
informed about the banks’ condition, seek to convert their deposits into cash. A full-blown 
liquidity crisis of major dimensions can be prevented only if depositors can somehow be 
reassured. An individual bank may be able to reassure its depositors by borrowing cash on the 
collateral of its sound assets from other banks and meeting all demands on it. But if the crisis is 
widespread, that recourse is not available. Some outside source of cash is necessary. A central 
bank with the power to create outside money is potentially such a source.”  (Milton Friedman 
and Anna J. Schwartz, 1987, page 307) 
 
Subsequently in the early 1930's when the Federal reserve were unable to accomplish the 
operation, which was the reason it had been created in the first place, the Federal Insurance was 
put into practice by the U.S. like a new alternate way to restore confidence to depositors which 
would eventually anticipate and impede an extensive liquidity crisis. For decades this 
arrangement functioned efficiently, during the time that banks were firmly governed or 
controlled -and moreover it would be protected from competition, considering that the inflation 
would stay moderate and proportionately consistent. However, the effectiveness of this 
arrangement became increasingly diminished as a result of the continuation of deregulation in an 
atmosphere which consisted a rather high and a fluctuating/constant changing inflation. y the 
Federal Reserve as “lender of last resort.”  
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Insurance of depositors against bank insolvency is of a magnitude that is well within the capacity 
of private casualty insurance. It could allow for differences among banks in the riskiness of their 
assets much more effectively than government insurance [see Ely (1985a, b)].  
 
“The U.S. has been almost unique in preserving a unit banking system with numerous 
independent banks. The current pressures for deregulation and the widening competition in 
financial intermediation is changing that situation. The barriers against interstate banking are 
weakening and very likely will ultimately fall completely. Such “non-banks” as Sears Roebuck, 
Menill-Lynch, and so on, in most respects are the equivalent of nationwide branch banks.” 
(Milton Friedman and Anna J. Schwartz, 1987, page 305)   According to Friedman and 
Schwartz, as these developments grow, it is likely that they decreased the possibility of liquidity 
crisis and thereby the consequence those crisis' which would arise. Due to this it has become 
rather ambiguous which consequences that has arisen in relation to the purpose of “lender of last 
resort”.  
 
Pursuant to Friedman, Vera Smith (1936, p. 148) correctly confirmed that: “A central bank is not 
a natural product of banking development. It is imposed from outside or comes into being as a 
result of Government favours.” (Milton Friedman and Anna J. Schwartz, 1987, page 305)  A 
central bank or its comparable substitute, once it has been created, will unenthusiastically take 
over the obligation to serve as a lender of last resort, due to the reality or the probability of a 
liquidity crisis. Friedman mentions that this was demonstrated by Goodhart's (1985) 
comprehensive investigation of the historical experience. “What is impressive about his evidence 
is the wide range of circumstances-in respect of political and economic arrangements-and the 
long span of time for which that has proved the outcome.”  (Milton Friedman and Anna J. 
Schwartz, 1987, page 305) 
 
The usual routine of the lender of last resort job were associated with restrictions over the 
government outside money. A composition like this includes apparent advantages. Nevertheless, 
 
 
 
 
60 
 
 
in reality these two activities are able to become detached, and this kind of disconnection is 
required for some suggestions for a monetary reform, assuming that the government were 
planning on carrying on to assist as a lender of last resort.  
 
“The existence of a lender of last resort has clearly enabled banks having access to the lender to 
operate on thinner margins of capital and cash reserves than they would otherwise have deemed 
prudent. This fact has been used as an argument both for and against the government assuming 
lender of last resort functions-for, as a way of lowering the cost of financial intermediation; 
against, as providing an implicit subsidy to financial intermediation. It has also led to the 
imposition of required reserve ratios, which has turned a subsidy into a tax by increasing the 
demand for non-interest bearing outside money.”  (Milton Friedman and Anna J. Schwartz, 
1987, page 307) 
 
Not interfering with financial negotiators so that they are free to pay whatever interest is required 
to achieve assets and to offer a variety of services over broad geographical areas seems clearly 
desirable on grounds of market efficiency. The open question is whether that is feasible or 
desirable without a continued role for government in such matters as requiring registration, 
provision of information, and the imposition of capital or reserve requirements. Moreover, 
certainly during a transition period, deregulation increases the danger of liquidity crises and so 
may strengthen the case for a governmental “lender of last resort.” That role could perhaps be 
phased out if market developments provided protection through insurance or otherwise against 
the new risks that might arise in a deregulated financial system.  
 
Goodhart’s argument (1985) that such an outcome, whether desirable or not, is not achievable, 
can be put to the test, by enlarging the opportunities for private insurance of deposit liabilities. If 
such insurance became widespread, risk-adjusted premiums could render regulatory restrictions 
unnecessary. It is more difficult to envision the market arrangements that would eliminate the 
pressure for a government “lender of last resort.”  
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Economic and political freedom 
 
“Historical evidence speaks with a single voice on the relation between political freedom and a 
free market. I know of no example in time or place of a society that has been marked by a large 
measure of political freedom, and that has not also used something comparable to a free market 
to organize the bulk of economic activity.”  (Friedman M. , 2009, page 9) 
 
According to Milton Friedman there is a strong association between economic and political 
freedom and pursuant to his theory it is not possible for a society to be democratic 
simultaneously as it is socialistic and thereby securing individual freedom.  
”History suggests only that capitalism is a necessary condition for political freedom. Clearly it is 
not a sufficient condition.”  (Friedman M. , 2009, page 10) Friedman explains how fascist 
countries such as Italy and Spain do not have political freedom, which is why the statement is not 
consistent with his theory. Economic freedom coexist with political subjection in certain 
countries such as China. In China liberalized financial systems exists, while there is severe 
constraint on political freedom. 
 
The role of the government in a free society  
 
Although Friedman believed in a free market without government regulation, he on the other 
hand, explained that absolute freedom does not exist and therefore there the government is still 
needed. “These then are the basic roles of government in a free society: to provide a means 
whereby we can modify the rules, to mediate differences among us on the meaning of the rules, 
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and to enforce compliance with the rules on the part of those few who would otherwise not play 
the game. The need for government in these respects arises because absolute freedom is 
impossible.”   
Nevertheless Friedman points out that although it is likely that anarchy exists in the world of 
philosophy, it is not possible in world of flawed people.  
 
3rd part 
 
Moral Hazards and the Principal/Agent Relationship 
 
Analyzing the case of the bankruptcy of Roskilde Bank (RB) is a complex case. There are many 
interesting angles to look into. Overall, to start from the top and down – we have the 
stockholders in RB as principal, the executives and the board being the agent. But in this 
quotation there is at least one more very interesting principal/agent relation, and that is the one 
between the CEO and the board; CEO still being the agent but this time the board is the 
principal. Further down the system of the bank we have the bank/investment advisor as the 
agent, and their supervisors together with the CEO being the principal (all of the above 
mentioned relations will be further evaluated). Milgrom and Roberts tells us how they see moral 
hazard as being an information problem, it’s the trouble and/or cost of monitoring and 
controlling the agents proper behaviour that constitutes the problem of moral hazard. (Milgrom 
and Roberts,1992: 168) 
 
The board in Roskilde Bank has been critized widely for not doing their job sufficiently well, not 
monitoring what was really going on in the bank, letting Niels Valentin consolidate too much 
power in the board and its decisions. This was due to many different things, one is that it is said 
that they were afraid of him (Jørgensen, Finn), they had too much to risk or were personal 
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friends of his (Jeppesen), either way it is a reflection of board members that were not doing what 
they were paid for: 
 
”When buyers cannot easily monitor the quality of goods or services that they receive, there is a 
tendency for some suppliers to substitute poor quality goods or to exercise too little effort, care, 
or diligence in providing the services. (Milgrom and Roberts,1992: 167) 
 
Asymetric and Symetric Information 
 
In a scenario where the principal has complete access and knowledge about the works of the 
agent it is called a symetric information. In other cases where the agent has a lot of information 
that he has to pass to the principal, it is referred to as asymetric information.  If the agent act of 
its own behalf it can choose to hide important information from the principal. 
Monitoring on behalf of the principal aka the stockbrokers of RB bank, the board members 
should have monitored the executives including N. Valentin, FT should then have monitored the 
board as well as the executives. The watchdog that were supposed to work in this scenario, did 
not do their jobs. 
 
”…monitoring is intended to decrease the probability of getting away undetected with the 
socially inefficient, self-interested behavior”  (Milgrom and Roberts,1992: 186) 
 
When a loan was larger than 50 mio. it had to be approved by the board. However, it was more 
often given by the corporate department and later presented to the board. This is what is referred 
to as after-appropriations, giving N. Valentin and his closest executives in the corporate 
department some sort of information monoploy when handing out these high risk loans. 
In the yearly accounting message from 2003, pp 13 it is informed that the following Directors of 
RB will be part of a bonus program: Niels Valentin, Arne Wilhelmsen, Klaus Bjerregård and 
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Stig Bo Jensen. Employee stock option are made available for the above mentioned executives to 
purchase within a certain timeframe, and at a given fixed price. This means that the executives 
have incentive to work in the direction of the stock value rising, the more they will benfit from 
the stock option programme. In the accounting message this act is described to be with the 
purpose of strenghtening RB´s result on the long run. And it would be natural to assume that this 
was really the motive behind the employee stock option. In order to give N. Valentin and his 
executives incentive to deliver the best possible for the bank, hereby achieving the highest 
stockholder value. 
 
However ,as this option was exposed to high degree of asymmetric information,  moral hazards 
ocurred. 
 
”Moral hazard problems may arise in any situation in which someone (who may be a supplier, a 
customer, an employee, or anyone else) is tempted to take an inefficient action or to provide 
distorted information (leading others to take inefficient actions) because the individual´s 
interests are not aligned with the group interest and because the report cannot easily be checked 
or the action accurately monitored. These problems are pervasive both in markets and in other 
forms of organization” (Milgrom and Roberts,1992: 168) 
The principal is trying to make the agent work for achieving the best possible result for the 
principal, this is also in the interest of the agent. Parameters that are easily to monitor will often 
be something that the agent is interested in living up to. This is to satisfy the principal. The agent 
wishes to keep the principal satisfied at all times – this is to secure the agent´s own job and 
reputation. The fullfillment of doing a good job does also apply. Another incitament along side 
with keeping the stockholders content is when the agent has formed part of a bonus programme, 
such as the employee stock option that was mentioned earlier. Here it is important to mention 
that RB had a total loan engagements to its clients of 6,2 billion kroner ultimo 2002, short time 
before Niels Valentin was awarded the employee stock option. Ultimo 2007 is the banks total 
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loan engagement of 32,5 billion kroner, five times bigger than it was 5 years earlier before Niels 
Valentin would benefit personally from the stocks positioning. (Jeppesen, 2008: 204) 
 
”Division executives may adopt policies that lead to high current performance that will be 
rewarded by bonuses and promotions even though these policies will ultimately destroy the long-
term profitability of the divisions they will have left behind. Some senior executives may pursue 
their own goals of status, high salaries, expensive ”perks” and job security rather than the 
stockholders interest, and so they may push sales growth over profits, treat themselves to huge 
staff and corporate jets, and oppose takeovers that would lead to their dismissal but would 
increase the value of the firm” (Milgrom and Roberts,1992: 170) 
 
The executives and stockholders have different motivations for doing business. Stockholders 
invest and strive for profit, while the executives of a company often quest for  power and a 
higher paycheck, better reputation and securing future employment. The decision maker do not 
carry the full impact of their decisions: 
 
”When those with critical information have interests different from those of the decision maker, 
they may fail to report completely and accurately the information needed to make good 
decisions” (Milgrom and Roberts,1992: 167) 
 
This can harm both the principals interest and the society´s interest. In the case of RB, both the 
agent´s interest (stockholders) and the society interest were harmed (taxpayers). 
 
”….one individual (the agent) acts on the behalf of another (the principal) and is supposed to 
advance the principal´s goals. The moral hazard problem arises when agent and principal have 
differing individual objectives and the principal cannot easily determine whether the agent´s 
reports and actions are being taken in pursuit of the principal´s goals or are self-interested 
misbehaviour” (Milgrom and Roberts,1992: 170) 
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Milgrom and Roberts explains that three conditions must be present in order for the moral hazard 
problem to occur: 
1)    First there must be some sort of alteration or discrepancy of interest between two parties 
involved with each other. 
2)    Second there must be an exchange of services, trade or other action between the two parties 
that initiates the discepancy interest, this is the reason of the interaction between the two 
involved bodies. 
3)    Third is condition of it being difficult to assess whether the job, contract, service etc. has 
been carried out as requested, succesfully or at all. The reason of this being difficult to assess is 
mostly due to the difficulty to monitor the result, and hereby not being able to prove an eg. 
breach of contract. 
 
One very perfect textbook example of moral hazard was when Niels Valentin was writing his 
stockholders that times were great, RB was expanding and it was their chance to get aboard the 
rolling train of fortune and buy stocks. When reality was very different and the bank actually was 
in trouble and needing liquidity. This is the agent fooling the principal for own gaining purposes, 
or not disclosing hidden information. (ELEX) 
 
According to Finn Jørgensen it was also common that there were fierce competition to sell as 
many stocks as possible in the branches. Also lending money for buying stocks were widely 
used. The bank employees were compensated the more they were selling. (Jørgensen, Finn)   
This is another example of principal/agent, the supervisors and the management being the 
principal, making the employees in the branches performing as agents and selling stocks to the 
clients. It is a general conception that most of the employees did not realize that the stocks they 
were selling towards the end of the RB era was very close to becoming worthless. 
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Analysis  
Through this chapter we will conduct our analysis. Our analysis will be divided into parts. 
 
1st part. Keynes through Minsky analysis 
 
1) According to this theory the main and the most important way to keep Roskilde’s bank system 
“healthy” was to control and regulate it. As we can see in the case, Roskilde bank had a freedom 
in their financial sector. The role of government in controlling the amount of money circulation 
and controlling the interest rates had no direct impact in Roskilde bank. And what Keynes argues 
is that the risk off floating debts can be avoided in putting them under control. If there was no 
control in this phase Roskilde Bank could make even more loans and debts in order to pay off 
previous loans and debts the bank had, until it reached too high amount and all the creditors, 
investors and lenders became more careful and refused to make more of them. So if the 
investments to the Roskilde bank were stuck, it stopped their whole banking system possibilities.  
The debt management policy that Keynes argues has to a certain degree a vital connection with 
the way banks run their business and can partly explain the reason for Roskilde Banks poor 
financial situation before bankruptcy. When understanding the necessity of resolving the 
problem of not being vigilant with the issuing of bonds, it can quickly be understood without 
strict regulation in Keynes opinion, it would spiral out of control. This can be seen by looking at 
how it is important to solve the higher-interest bonds first before new lower-interest bonds in 
order for banks to maintain a high degree of flexibility and freedom to make future policies 
function optimally.  
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2) “As banks are interdependent of each other. Banks with deposits deficit is dependent on other 
banks dare lend them money. And this is what the problem is when it collapses the banks go into 
panic.”– (translated directly from Danish interview with Jesper Jespersen). This leads to the 
other important thing is the Central’s bank interruption in to Roskilde’s bank financial sector. 
The Central bank had important role in not just retaking the bank over, but also and supporting 
and interrupting it in the right moment. As you can see no support and no intervention from the 
Central bank according to Minsky moment could have led to a total collapsing of banks 
economy.  
 
3) The last thing is saying that Roskilde’s bank economists could not foresee the future. It has 
indirectly influence on the Central bank, because government trusts the economists and if they 
made the implication that the economy is healthy and Roskilde Bank is dealing with their 
problems and they can solve them, so both the government and the Central bank did not feel a 
need to interrupt and force restrictions unto the bank in order to make sure that their economy 
was under control.   
 
Minsky moment:  Roskilde’s bank instability in the end was caused by bank’s crediting 
activities. While world’s economy was growing and no one could foresee that it will fall down, 
Roskilde bank became very optimistic and started to take much more risk together with the 
investors. Companies were borrowing bigger loans and debts in condition to give them back later 
in the future. Roskilde bank and other lenders were reducing the initial contributions and in their 
financial sector they start to make innovations bypassing those “not effective” regulation’s and 
control’s constructions, which could not to adapt to the new conditions. So the bank loses some 
of protection mechanism, this thereby leads the bank reaching the ‘Minsky Moment’ or in other 
words a point of no return, tis then shortly after followed by a ‘Minsky Meltdown’. The 
economic crisis has a huge influence on the financial sector but” […]it is not that which is the 
cause of the crisis, but it helps to build some tension - there will be some violent tremors in the 
financial sector which then throws waves into the real economy and in fact that the financial 
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sector has a hard time at all to function because, Roskilde Bank was an example, run into their 
own problems.”– (translated directly from Danish interview with Jesper Jespersen).Which was 
how the number of insolvency reaches the highest point in Roskilde bank and there was no one 
willing to invest or bail out in the suffering financial sector thus also in the suffering bank sector. 
According to Minsky that kind of behavior was what lead Roskilde bank to such a poor financial 
state that they filed for bankruptcy. 
 
FIH: This part of the theory helps both explain the disastrous state the economy ended in and 
similarly it shows the entire process that Roskilde bank went through. When there is a long 
period of prolonged state of prosperity in the economy, it influences the financial sector by 
making it increasingly fragile. This lies in the ways that highly profitable areas of the economy 
are substantially rewarded for continuously increase in their debt amounts they slowly 
accumulate. Not only are these business that are being rewarded encouraged continuing this 
process but it encourages other businesses to follow same apparent successful path. This then 
makes lenders or banks to believe that there are no worries to be had that indebtedness will not 
be paid. This entire process can be seen by looking at Roskilde Bank through their timeline. 
 
2nd part. Milton Friedman theory analysis 
 
As it was mentioned in the theory, Friedman believed in as little, if any government interference 
and thereby a free market. His theory of economic monetarism was at the time of Roskilde 
bank's existence supported by many other economists and it was therefore applied to financial 
institutions worldwide.  
 
Friedman pointed out that the banks had to be self-regulating, and that government interference 
causes more harm than good. Roskilde bank had to be regulating without any government 
intervention. According to Friedman, when Roskilde bank became under government control, the 
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government made some restrictions about supporting companies which had economic problems 
and Roskilde bank was giving credits at a subsidized interest rate. That kind of support was usual 
for the financial institutions which were under control before their economic liberalization and 
that made Roskilde bank to be in poor financial position.  
 
Financial deregulation for the financial institutions too rapid and unpolished way of improving 
the banking. Financial deregulation also meant that Roskilde Bank could pay whatever interest 
that was required to obtain funds and to charge whatever interest that was bearable to their 
borrowers, which at the time seemed desirable on grounds of market efficiency. Because 
Roskilde’s bank managers was motivated to make more profits for the bank, so they were not 
able to change their motivation on the totally other option, like procedure of evaluating credit 
worth. They were not able to resist of viciousness of competitive market.  
 
Liberalization of the bank had to be done in order to escape from the bankruptcy. Liberalization 
starts when the bank can foresee the future. However, Roskilde Bank which had been liberalized 
went bankrupt. The financial liberalization was identified by dangerous inflation, unemployment, 
and current account problems causing a serious liquidity crisis, which explains why Roskilde 
Bank went bankrupt. It was not unexpected when the financial liberalization at the same time 
was followed by a stabilization program. As a result, deciding whether liberalization efforts are 
accountable for the financial crisis is a rather complex situation to be dealing with.  
 
“What one could then say is that when you place Keynes and Friedman up against each other, so 
one can say that Friedman is recurring to the real theory of production where the monetary 
sector and money creation influencing inflation and inflation development. Here we are 
referring to an expression called dichotomy, which means separation where on the one hand, the 
real economic process, where the goal is to get the market to function optimally, and there is 
limited room for economic policy and then we have the financial sector which is living its own 
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life because finance is the oil of the system and get it to run, and if you pour too much oil, well 
then you create financial pressure that comes out in the form of inflation. 
 
All of this you probably already know really well, but if you contradict them it is like saying the 
classical - and Friedman - the neoclassical.”4 
 
According to Sjaaasted (1983) and Edwards (1985) the financial crisis came from the 1980's and 
they claimed that it was not due to trade and financial liberalization that the crisis had arisen, 
however it stemmed from utilization of the stabilization programs.  
 
These programs are in a definite minority. Nevertheless, the majority of observers states 
specifically that financial liberalization, stems from mislead financial deregulation with non-
conducted manners.  
 
“What is surprising about Friedman, because he seems as anachronistic and many of those who 
are his proselytes, even up to a few years ago, they think they can control the money supply. The 
European central bank has a policy concept of controlling the money supply, without 
understanding that in modern society, it came already in the 30s and remain in violent degree 
today-was created in the private banks. And private banks' behavior has no control over, and 
one could see. So money it exploded after all, no matter what the others thought about it. Just try 
to draw some curves up the development of money and then you can see it exploded, and why? 
Yes it was because bank loans creates bank deposits and bank deposits are money. It is to give 
private banks to print money. Would you be able to resist the temptation?”5 
 
 
                                                 
4 Interview 3 p. 1  
5 Interview 3 p. 3 
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3rd part. Analysis Agent/Principal 
 
In the course of the peak years and downfall of RB, asymmetric information were often the case 
between agent and principal. As described in the P/A chapter earlier, multi-level of P/A relations 
were existing in the bank.  
 
RB´s management and board were agents for the principal: owner of the bank, in this case the 
stockholders. But stockholders were exposed to the act of moral hazard coming from the 
management and board. Or rather, it is safe to believe that the promoter of this moral hazard was 
indeed the CEO Niels Valentin, and a few people of the executives surrounding him. They were 
the only ones having sufficient access and knowledge to know the magnitude of the moral 
hazard. One could suggest that at least three people knew about this, Niels Valentin, Lars Jensen 
and Allan Hansen Christensen. Lars Jensen division director of the corporate department, was 
responsible for most of the big loan engagements to the big risky clients within the real-estate 
business. (Jeppesen, 2008: 33) 
 
Allan Hansen Christensen were Lars Jensen´s boss. Allan H. Christensen were head and 
responsible of both the corporate and the credit department. He was a comparatively well 
qualified banker coming from an international career in both London and Luxembourg before 
joining RB in 2004. (Børsen, 24/3/10). Lars Jensen was expelled from the bank August 25, 2008. 
Same day Allan H. Christensen was laid off. 
 
We believe that at least these three key-people must have been aware of the ongoing 
deterioration of the bank´s general condition and stocks. Lars Jensen had given the loan and had 
the daily contact to the customers, and must therefore have had access to information, as well as 
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monitoring the state of the projects. Allan H. Christensen had the sufficient professional 
experience from the banking sector to see what was going on. Allan H. Christensen discourages 
his parents from buying stocks in 2007. He also explains Niels Valentin about his concern about 
the biggest loan engagements, and suggests to bring down the loans to the biggest clients as well 
as the need for diversifying to other sectors. (Jeppesen). Niels Valentin rejects the idea when 
presented to it. 
 
Despite having this information Niels Valentin still pursued to sell stocks to the clients, still 
convinced his employees that they should sell stocks to client and that it was a good deal for 
them. This is exemplified when NVH, as earlier mentioned suggest the principal to buy stocks, 
telling them at it was the right time and a good investment. But the truth was that the bank was in 
very bad condition, and the sell out of the stock was fundamental for the bank do survive. 
 
According to our interviewees, few of the employees knew about this. Ole Nielsen tells how his 
bank connection in Roskilde Bank, herself invested her grandchild savings shortly before the 
bankruptcy. 
 
Hidden Information: The agent engaging in moral hazard due to asymmetric information. 
Examples of this was illustrated in RB when Peter Müller were not telling the truth on the 
general assembly february 2, 2008. Chairman Müller were not being transparent about the state 
of the bank. The liquidity of the bank were already at that point critical, deposits had decreased 
dramatically, in a bit more than a month customers had withdrawn 1,5 billion kroner from the 
bank. 
 
Relationship between CEO and board. Board is weak, CEO strong. He cuts down boardmeeting 
from twice a month to once a month. They were afraid of him, afraid of him getting mad. The 
same was the case in Amagerbanken, having a very strong, independent leader. Anonymous 
source says that this is typical for boards in smaller banks, the board being weak.    
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4th part. Anual reports 
 
This section of the project will be aimed at briefly comparing Roskilde Bank’s annual report of 
2007 and 2008 with the interviews. Some specific parts of the Annual report will be used in 
order to be used against the interviews. The interview with Ole Nielsen is the most relevant to 
compare with the annual report, because he has been a shareholder for many years at Roskilde 
Bank. It will help usto gain a banking overview of these specific years using primary qualitative 
data and secondary quantitative data. When looking at the annual report we will first analyze 
Roskilde Bank’s Goals and strategies and find some matching points with the interviews.  
 
“Roskilde Bank vision is to be independent, active, committed and enthusiastic” It should come 
as no surprise that an annual report serves to present the company in best light possible keeping 
within some legislations that exist about the matters. Despite being skeptical when reading the 
Annual report we do find some links between the interview and the statements.  
 
Roskilde Bank states that they will be active and independent, which means they will be able to 
supply the customers and shareholders with solutions at the right time and give them the 
attention they need while providing attractive and profitable investments. What Ole Nielsen 
actually states is that he wanted to be “easily in touch with my money and I prefer being a big 
customer in a little bank, than being a little customer in a big bank” He actually felt like Roskilde 
Bank gave him that feeling of important customer and it did give continuous attractive and 
profitable investments with satisfied shareholders, “it was a really good business and it was 
really good customer service.”  
 
 
 
 
 
75 
 
 
 
He did gain a lot of money from the Roskilde Bank shares, “suddenly I was left with a nice big 
amount of money both on my pension scheme and “frie midler” and I felt like the sky was the 
limit.”  
 
When asked about the financial crisis and its effect on Roskilde Bank he does say that 
“everything up to 2006 - 2007 was pretty normal and customers did earn a lot of money but it 
then began to head downwards and customers and shareholders lost money”. 
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Data taken from the annual report of 2007 page 6 
 
As we can see above in the graph, often referred as the bottom line, net profit is calculated by 
subtracting a company's total expenses from its total revenue, showing what the company has 
earned or lost in in a given period of time, which in our case is from 2003 to 2007. We can see 
that actually their net profit goes upward from 2004 up to 2006 and then begins to fall down 
from 2006 and onwards. “It was then when people began losing their money, many of those who 
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lost their money where small investors which had up to 100,000 Kr in their children savings and 
just lost everything.” 
 
Another way of finding out how well they did and support Ole Nielsen’s beliefs about Roskilde 
Bank going bad after 2006, we can use the earnings per share. Earnings per share is a very good 
indicator of the profitability of any organization, and it is one of the most widely used measures 
of profitability. The earning per share is a useful measure of profitability, when calculated over a 
number of years indicates whether the earning power of the company has improved or 
deteriorated. From the graph below you can actually see that the years from 2003 to 2004 were 
very stable years where there wasn’t big changes in the earning power of Roskilde Bank. As 
2005 approaches there is a huge increase of 100% which then leads to a steady increase 
throughout 2005. At the end of 2005 and beginning of 2006 you could see that the earnings per 
share went down which showed that profitability of Roskilde bank was going down. Ole Nielsen 
clearly states that:” Customers had gained lot of money through the years 2005 – 2006, but 
beginnings of 2007 it initiates to go into the other direction and people lost money.” 
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Conclusion: 
 
So when having discussed the theories of Keynes, Minsky, Friedman and Principal Agent while 
simultaneously comparing them with each other and the annual reports. It can then be seen that 
the process the financial sector has gone through to reach the economic crisis in 2007- started 
with the economic crash in the 1930’s.  After the economic crash of the 1930’s the financial 
sectors line of thoughts and policy’s changed to be Keynesian. After this there was a long 
prolonged period of prosperity, which lead to the strict regulations being set down in the 1930’s 
to slowly be loosened and giving the market more freedom since it seemed like it was all positive 
and there was no negative effects. This accumulated in the 1980’s that a different line of thought 
and policy took over namely the Friedman ideas free market, liberalization and privatization. 
This bursts the financial sector into an economic boom, that only encouraged the reasons for 
loosening the regulations on the market and the financial sector. Then in 2007 when the financial 
sector reached suddenly a Minsky Moment, shortly followed by the Minsky Meltdown in the 
economic crisis, there was a massive scare and panic swept through the financial sector. Thus the 
policy’s returned very rapidly to be Keynesian again, seeing the necessity of his ideas.  
 
Then by looking at how the theories of Keynes, Minsky and Friedman aided in the explanation 
of the economic crisis and financial sectors evolution. Then to get clarity about what were the 
more specific reasons for Roskilde Bank having to file for bankruptcy, there needs to be utilized 
the Principal Agent theory to help explain a main point in a bank’s failure, namely ‘Bad 
Banking’. While also analyzing the annual reports to see the development of Roskilde Bank’s 
economic status. Simultaneously it can be concluded that Roskilde Bank’s was representation or 
product of a period in the financial sector where Friedman’s policy’s dominated.  
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“Because you cannot be guarded against bad banking and that is what they say now mantra in the 
banking sector. I spoke with someone from the bank council and he said "the banks that go down 
- bad management. [...] The second set of the explanation is of course that when 
macroeconomics and macroeconomics interact and we create a macro economic development as 
just allowed to grow, while politicians standing and clapping her hands while throwing coal on 
the fire. And then you have a banking sector that can create unlimited with money, you get the 
some self-reinforcing processes. Reasonable people could then have said that private banks will 
not even be able to stop and therefore we have a macro-economic responsibility, that this is not 
out of hand. For they cannot see themselves with the regulation there is, and especially because it 
had lessened regulation earlier until the 80s. Back then, there was indeed a very much tighter 
banking regulation with regard to how much they can lend.” – (translated directly from Danish 
interview with Jesper Jespersen) 
 
It can then be concluded that Keynes theory was a product of its time, but has proven to be a 
relevant way thinking yet again with the emergence of a new economic crash. In the same way 
Friedman’s theory was product of his time with continues positive results, but its usefulness has 
now run its course, with focus being shifted back to Keynes and Minsky. The Principal Agent 
displays its usefulness as it provides that extra explanation to why banks go bankrupt that 
Keynes, Minsky and Friedman cannot provide. Our problem definition states: 
Discussion 
 
It can be argued that by looking at the explanations of the theories provided for economic 
collapse of the financial sector and by the explanations supplied by the principal agent concepts 
to Roskilde Banks failure. That these two factors combined together to put the final nail in the 
coffin for Roskilde Bank forcing to file for bankruptcy. Roskilde Bank was the first of the banks 
in Denmark to go bankrupt when the financial crisis broke out in 2008. This lead to there being a 
more observant attitude in the banking sector in Denmark. It caused simultaneously a chain 
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reaction in the Danish banking world since, banks now where very careful in their investment 
considerations, thus leading to an increasingly locked economic situation. As mentioned in the 
Keynes and Minsky theory the economy always have a portion of instability in it no matter how 
positive it looks. This can then be argued that with this constant instability in the economy it 
always has the potential to grow more unstable and even more so the potential grow to a critical 
point of no return. It can therefore be seen as the possibility for an economic crash is always 
there waiting for the right trigger. 
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Appendix 1 
 
 
 
Interview with Ole Nielsen  
Transcript  
 
Interviewer: Hvorfor valgte du at investerer i Roskilde bank og blive aktionær i Roskilde bank?  
 
Informant: Det havde noget med et kundeforhold… Jeg har være kunde i danske bank, siden jeg fik mig 
børneopsparing og så har jeg det princip med når jeg driver forretning at jeg kan godt lide at være tæt på. 
Jeg vil hellere være en stor kunde i et lille system end en lille kunde i et stort system. Danske bank blev 
mere og mere fjern for mig. De vil tvinge mig med mine investeringer ind i deres hovedsæde og jeg var i 
en lokalafdeling og så sagde jeg ”det vil jeg ikke”. Hvis ikke i vil sætte ressource ude i jeres lokalsystem, 
så finder jeg en anden bank. Så gik jeg til Roskilde bank som ganske almindelig kunde og det var jeg jo 
så et års tid eller sådan noget lignende. Så købte jeg aktier og de styrende nogle papirer jeg havde og de 
gjorde de rigtig rigtig rigtig godt endda. Det bevirkede så at jeg lagde alle mine bankforretninger hos dem. 
De kørte mine investeringer osv og det var bare rigtig godt. Og så blev de mere og mere påtrængende med 
at få solgt deres egne aktier, men det var ikke noget jeg på noget tidspunkt… Jeg er jo mand for min hat, 
jeg siger nej og ja når jeg mener det skal siges. Men lige pludselig så havde jeg en pæn klump både på 
min pensionsopsparing og også mine frie midler af Roskilde bank. Og det jo bare… jeg troede jo the sky 
was the limit ik’ ogs’? Det kørte bare derudaf. Jeg tjente rigtig mange penge. Jeg solgte lidt hist og pist og 
købte igen osv. Det var en rigtig god forretning og det var et rigtig godt kundeforhold. Nå men så kunne 
man mærke at det blev lidt mere pres på og det lige som om at deres holdning i dagligdagen blev ændret 
til at det var dem der ville bestemme. På et tidspunkt vil jeg gerne sælge nogle at mine Roskilde bank 
aktier og det var lidt modvilligt og jeg nåede så aldrig at få solgt de sidste klumper jeg havde. Men jeg 
skal retfærdigvis sige at de aktier jeg har solgt i Roskilde bank, under processen, det har været en rigtig 
god forretning. Så var der en generalforsamling og vi taler altså om millionbeløb her og i min proces og 
min dagligdag er det noget der svarer til 10-15% af mit totale værdigpapir. Det var altså ikke uvæsenligt 
for mig. Men så var der jo denne her generelforsamling hvor jeg hjemmefra havde siddet og lavet en lille 
kladde til når jeg skulle på talerstolen omkring at jeg synes eksponering på bygge-siden var for voldsom, 
fordi efter mine beregninger havde vil 40% på byggeri. Jeg havde kladden i lommen, men så var der jo 
atmosfæren og bespisningen var i orden og der blev forelagt hvad der skulle forelægges og der var stort 
set kun klapsalver. Så sagde jeg til mig selv ”du er bare en gammel sur idiot” så jeg sagde ikke noget. 
Men så fik vi så noget information umiddelbart efter og jeg tænkte ”der er noget galt her” så tog jeg og 
skrev en mail tror jeg det var, eller ringede til Søren Andersen som så var ansat som direktør og så sagde 
jeg ”jeg føler altså at der er et eller andet”…  ”ej, men der var ikke noget”. Han kommer fra danske bank 
systemet og har lige overtaget jobbet. Der kan sgu ikke være noget galt her. Nå men han snakkede mig så 
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ind i en krog. Så gik der en periode igen og så var der noget med nogle islændinge som skulle have 
overtaget noget, men som så røg på gulvet. Så ringede jeg til søren igen, og siger at jeg med modvilje må 
sælge mine aktier, kurserne er styrtdykket, hvad fanden foregår der? Jamen der var ikke noget, så han 
inviterer mig på kaffe og jeg fik en kop kaffe på hans kontor. Vi var sådan rimelig på bølgelængde, men 
jeg havde fået idéen om at jeg ville lave en støtteklub. Støtteforening for Roskilde bank og den 
præsenterede jeg for ham og så gik han helt i baglås. Han mente det ville være meget meget skadeligt for 
banken og han kom med nogle letkøbte argumenter om at jamen det var børsnoteret og han kunne ikke 
oplyse… og vi måtte ikke… osv osv. Nå ok. Så kan jeg sgu ikke engang huske processen. Så ringede og 
mailede vi sammen mange gange, Søren og jeg. På et tidspunkt så skrev jeg til ham at nu går jeg i 
pressen.  
Så fik jeg en lang forklaring pr mail at det ville være dybt skadeligt og arktier… og børsnoteret og alt det 
der… Så skrev jeg så det der famøse læserbrev efter at man havde lukket op og sagt at nu kunne banken 
ikke leve længere. Så brød helvede løs. Det var på småsparenes præmisser, for det var jo alle dem der 
havde aktier for 20.000 kr. op til en million eller to. Dem der virkelig var tunge, de holdte sig væk. De 
turde simpelthen ikke at vove og røre vores projekt. Da det havde kørt nogle dage så inviterede Søren mig 
op på sit kontor og så siger han så ” hvad er det du vil?” så siger jeg ”jamen jeg vil det at bestyrelsen skal 
væk, for jeg mener ikke de har varetaget… så mener jeg også at du skal forklare omverdenen hvad du har 
vidst fra din ansættelse af, for jeg går ikke ud fra at du skipper et godt job uden at sætte dig ind i hvad det 
nye job indeholder. Nå, men der var ikke rigtigt noget at gøre, så gik der noget tid og så ringede 
bestyrelsesformanden Peter møller, og jeg kom ud og snakke med ham. Der var processen så langt i gang 
og vi havde fået bestyrelsesmedlemmer osv. Men det hele startede meget meget ustruktureret. Det er klart 
det var lidt egoisme fra start, altså det var mine egne behov der gjorde det. Det var mit første læserbrev 
jeg nogensinde har skrevet. Det famøse læserbrev der gjorde at helvede brød løs. Men man skal ikke tro at 
der var bank sektorens problemer jeg ville løse, nej.  
 
Interviewer: Den støtteforening som du foreslog Søren Andersen, var det for at bakke op om Roskilde 
bank inden de gik….  
 
Informant: Det var inden det blev offentligt at det kørte dårligt man påstod jo fra bankens side at det var 
dårlig presse og at banken var efter dem og finanstilsynet var nogle onde mennesker osv osv. Så på det 
tidspunkt var det for at hjælpe banken. For banken har jo været det lokale samlingsmærke for sport og 
kultur i Roskilde, det har det jo været i flere generationer.  
 
Interviewer: hvornår fandt du ud af at det var ved at gå galt? Var der et punkt hvor det gik op for dig at 
nu…  
 
Informant: Jeg var ikke hurtigere ude end alle andre. Det var Peter Møller som skrev et læserbrev at 
banken ikke længere kunne leve mere, der var ikke nogen vej tilbage. Det var så umiddelbart efter at jeg 
tog fat i Søren Andersen og han indikerede i runde tal at beløbet med manglede 750 millioner kunne 
holde Roskilde bank kørende. Så siger jeg til ham ”hvis jeg kan skaffe de 750 millioner, hva så?” jamen 
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det var hast værk og det kan slet ikke lade sig gøre. Så han var faktisk afvisende. Først havde han sagt at 
der manglede ca 750 millioner og så da jeg troede at jeg kunne skaffe dem, så var man sket ikke 
interesseret. Så tænkte jeg ”hvad foregår der her?” Jeg forsøgte jo så… jeg har en god bekendt, som er 
blandt de meget velstillede i Danmark og han ringede jeg til og så siger han ”ved du hvad, det er spild af 
tid” For det første er det ikke 570 millioner man mangler, sagde han. Det er et meget større beløb. For det 
andet så er Roskilde bank dårlig bankdrevet. Det har været en dårlig drift de sidste mange mange år og 
han ved hvad han taler om han her min ven. Mindre end 10 dage efter at de 750 millioner var nævt for 
mig fra Søren Andersen, så var det 4 milliader vi snakkede om. Så kunne jeg godt se der kun var en ting 
at gøre, derefter blev der lavet den ekstraordinære generalforsamling… Men det der lidt chokerer mig, det 
er det jeg kan mig ved mig selv og mine andre bekendte, at selvom det har rystet en økonomisk og faktisk 
var en voldsom sag i mit liv, i det års tid eller halvandet det varede, så fortrænger man det! Hvis i spørger 
om datoer og perioder, så er det bare væk. Til trods for at det har kostet mange penge, og meget blod, 
sved og tårer.  
 
Interviewer: Men det er måske meget positivt.  
 
Informant: Ja, det kan man sige. Altså hvordan de personer som er konkurs og som skal lægge deres liv 
om osv… hvordan de har det og om de også fortrænger det, det kan man måske tvivle på. Jamen for mit 
eget vedkommende, det må ikke lyde forkert, jeg har været nødt til at lægge nogle ting om, men altså vi 
får sgu stadigvæk det pension som vi skal have. Det var ikke større for mig end ”nå, ja ok. Vi havde tjent 
mange penge på de der løsagtige aktier og så måtte vi afleverer nogle af dem. Det er måske meget 
retfærdigt.  
 
Interviewer: Hvordan var stemningen i Roskilde bank under de hårdere år? Altså slut 2007 of frem til 
2008  
 
Informant: Hvad, siger du syv, jamen så er du lidt tideligt ude 
 
Interviewer: Der kommer ikke noget frem i slutningen af 2007? Der er ikke noget som på den måde 
indikere…. 
 
Informant: Der var jo noget ballade omkring Valentines optioner of de to andre direktørers aktie optioner. 
Man synes jo det var ligesom et tag-selv bord, men ellers var der jo klapsalver hele vejen rundt. Folk 
havde tjent mange penge på deres aktier i 2005, 6 og 7 begyndte det så at gå nedad. Men folk havde tjent 
mange penge og derfor kunne de ikke rigtigt tillade sig …. Fordi der nu kommer en nedtur. Det var jo 
meget positivt indtil August – september 08.  
 
Interviewer: var det August 08 at den lukkede?  
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Informant: Ja, jeg vil sige indtil midt i 07, var der kun klapsalver. Men så bagefter begyndte… Det der 
med når folk mister penge, ja så vender det hele jo. Mange af småsparende. Altså dem der havde deres 
børneopsparing og nogle få med 0-100.000 kr. i Roskilde bank aktier. Det var dem der først vendte, for de 
var ikke helt med på at når man vinder, kan man altså også godt tabe. Jeg vil sige at op til midt 07 der var 
der ikke nogle negative følelser.  
 
Interviewer: Men du har også strækket dig ud på nogle forskellige ting… Du havde kun 10-15% 
investeret i Roskilde bank. For mange andre er det 100%  
 
Informant: Der er mange af andres værdipapir havde de jo kun Roskilde bank. De var blevet anbefalet det 
af deres bankrådgivere.  
 
Interviewer: Er det din opfattelse at finansrådgiverne gjorde deres arbejde fyldestgørende? 
 
Informant: Der er to steder hvor jeg retter min kritik. Nej, der er tre. To officielle steder, det er de to 
revisions selskaber og så finanstilsynet. Det kan ikke passe at man betaler en million kr. til revisorer, som 
giver blanke påtegninger til sådan en bank som Roskilde bank, umiddelbart før.  5-6 var jo guldårene i 
påtegningerne. I 07 syv kunne man se noget… men det var ikke noget der var alarmklokker. I Danmark er 
vi jo ved at være kommet dertil at alt skal der være kontrol på. Vi kan ikke købe en lejlighed uden at der 
skal være syn til skøn og der skal være alt mulig tilsyn fra det offentligt side af,  men man kan godt have 
en sektor der betyder det vitale for hele landet, som er banksektoren. Men så myndighederne, deres opsyn 
det svigter total og det mener jeg virkeligt at det gør. Vi kan se det nu. Tønder bank f.eks. jamen der har 
de jo heller ikke gjort deres arbejde. Man kan ikke fra den ene dag til den anden lige pludselig have god 
økonomi og dagen efter gå konkurs. Det kan man bare ikke. I Roskilde bank kan det godt være der har 
siddet en stærk direktør, men en svag bestyrelse, men finanstilsynet det er altså landets tilsyn. Det er 
fuldstændig ubegribeligt at de ikke har stillet sig med nøglerne og sagt ”nu låser vi, hvis ikke i vil stille 
ind til højre, så har i ikke noget vejlicens”. Jeg har set, lidt senere i processen hvor jeg kom til at sidde i 
bestyrelsen og bad om at se papirerne, hvor man kunne se alt hvad der havde med handlen… man vidste 
godt finanstilsynet var møg utilfreds med banken, men der blev bare ikke gjort noget. Senere henne har 
jeg været i forbindelse med et par politikere omkring det. Det er rystende! Jeg håber ikke nogen af jer skal 
ind og sidde i finanstilsynet, for det kan man i hvert fald ikke få noget selvrespekt af. De har ikke gjort 
deres arbejde. Ydermere så ansætter man manden fra finanstilsynet i finansiel stabilitet som 
administrerende direktør senere. Ah, det er svært for mig at forstå. Jeg mener helt klart at revision skal 
være første vathund overfor offentligheden og finanstilsynet som næste vagthund overfor det offentlige 
og så selvfølgelig bestyrelsen. De har bevist at det var en tante-bestyrelse.  
 
Interviewer: ja, de får jo flere påtaler fra finanstilsynet som ikke bliver efterlevet.  
 
Informant: jaja, og bliver trukket i langdrag, og der mener jeg at man nu i dagens erhvervsavis, så står der 
jo at (unclear) Finanstilsynet, det kunne de bare have gjort. De skal ikke udstede bøder men bare lukke 
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lortet og give nogle påtaler som gør at de bliver efterlevet, for der er ingen tvivl om at en Valentine som 
har været bankens – sandsynligvis en meget meget dygtig direktør i de første 10-15 år han var direktør, 
han har kørt uden finanstilsynet. Jeg forstår faktisk ikke at offentligheden ikke er kommet med et større 
ramaskrig over finanstilsynet, for hvis finanstilsynet hjalp bankerne vil tingene se anderledes ud. Jeg så 
forleden at der sidder 230 fuldtidsstillinger i finanstilsynet, så der er noget kapacitet, men så har de 
selvfølgelig det problem at det ikke er det bedst lønnede sted, så det er ikke første divisions spillerne der 
sidder derinde, de er ikke –kunne man frygte- skarpe nok dem der sidder derinde. Det ved jeg ikke noget 
om, men man kan antage det. For det første har de ikke kunne trænge igennem i de der – hvor mange er vi 
oppe på? 12-13 banker, der er lukkede. Det er dem der har siddet med kontrolfunktionen på dem alle 
sammen.  
 
Interviewer: Så du mener altså at man som finansmand for finansiel stabilitet ville være i stand til at tjene 
mange flere penge i den private sektor og derfor er det folk med mindre bemidlede… eller lavere 
ambitionsniveau som vil sidde i finanstilsynet? 
 
Informant: Nej, jeg mener de ansatte i finanstilsynet, de er ikke af den kvalitet eller har den kontinuitet i 
systemet, for som jeg fornemmer det er det et sted man kommer ind og suger lidt til sig og så videre 
igen… blandt andet fordi lønniveauet er meget lavere end ude i det private erhvervsliv og derfor mener 
jeg måske ikke at det er de helt skarpeste knive i skuffen man har derinde. Sandsynlighedsvis falder det 
her jo tilbage til regeringen eller ministeriet, fordi det er ministeriet der sørger for systemet og jeg har 
været på Christiansborg i forbindelse med processen og tale med nogle af dem. Mange af dem vil jo 
simpelthen slet ikke røre ved det, for der er ikke noget image i det. Det er kun nogle kolde penge. Vores 
ministre på det tidspunkt, Bendt Bendtsen, som erhvervsminister og Brian Mikkelsen – de ville bare ikke 
røre ved det der! Hvad den dybe årsag er til det, det har jeg aldrig fundet ud af.  
 
Interviewer: Direktøren for nationalbanken han var også rimelig distanceret overfor det….  
 
Informant: Han var jo også ude – hæng mig ikke op på tidsintervallet – han var ude tidligt 07, tror jeg det 
var, med nogle udtalelser omkring at det var så sundt alt sammen i den danske bankdrift. Så han har 
åbenbart også være ført bag lyset.  
 
Interviewer: Vi springer lidt, jeg håber det er i orden. Konkursen  i Roskilde bank, hvordan ser du at den 
har påvirket bankverden i Danmark? Altså ud fra dit eget synspunkt.  
 
Informant: Det er den væsentligste ting der er sket i den danske bank sektor siden (unclear) fordi hvis 
Roskilde bank bare kunne have holdt sig på skinnerne et halvt års tid længere, så var den danske bank – 
sådan som jeg ser det – den der var røget i problemer først. Hvis den danske bank var den første der kom i 
problemer, så havde man været nødt til at takle det hele meget anderledes, fordi man kunne bare ikke lade 
den danske bank lide skade udadtil, men fordi det var Roskilde bank, sådan en lille bank… det kunne man 
godt klare. For de milliarder kunne man godt klare uden at lide international skade. Så var det så at knag i 
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Roskilde bank skabte de andre dønninger og det centrerer sig – sådan som jeg ser det, og det er der nok 
mange som vil sige er en forkert opfattelse, men jeg har den alligevel – så centrerede bølgerne sig ind 
mod danske bank og så var man nødt til at lave bankpakke 1,2 og 3 – for den danske bank kunne man 
ikke tåle national set, skulle komme i problemer. Men hvis Roskilde bank kunne have kørt et halvt år 
længere, så havde man været nødt til at lave nogle andre systemer. Det var ærgerligt for Roskilde bank at 
den skulle være den første. Det var bad timing simpelthen.  
 
Interviewer: hvordan mener du at konkurs i Roskilde bank kunne have været undgået?  
 
Informant: Den kunne ikke have være undgået. Der var lige begyndt at rasle ud af skufferne med bygge-
belåninger… Der var ingen vej tilbage. Det var jo voldsomme penge man havde problemer med. 750 
millioner, det kunne man have klaret, enten lokalt eller fundet nogle få store investorer til, men da man 
snakker milliard beløb så var der lukket. Også skete der jo det, at i andre banker, begyndte der at komme 
informationer om at de andre banker gik det ikke så godt som man troede og så gik alle dem der havde 
penge i lomme – de gik i baglås. Jeg kunne godt have set at sådan en som Roskilde bank, hvis man havde 
vendt… Hvis krakket var afløst af en kontrolleret strukturændring… f.eks. havde danske bank været 
statens omdrejningspunkt, så kunne jeg godt se at Roskilde bank var passet perfekt til syd bank, eller 
jyske bank eller spar nord for den sags skyld. Men det skulle bare have været kontrolleret. Det blev det 
ikke…  
Så timingen var bare ærgerlig… at det skulle gå sådan for Roskilde bank, for som sagt mener jeg at den 
kunne have været reddet hvis den kom som nummer to eller tre i processen.  
 
Interviewer: Interessant. Når du første gang investerer i Roskilde bank, og det hele går rigtig fint, hvordan 
er dun mening omkring bestyrelsen? Er du bekendt med hvem der sidder i bestyrelsen på daværende 
tidspunkt, og hvad de har af forudsætninger og således…  
 
Informant: Ikke forudsætninger, men det er jo det lokale pengeinstitut og de lokale kræfter der sidder der 
og jeg har aldrig selv vurderet at man skal være økonomiprofessor for at sidde i en bank bestyrelse, men 
det mener jeg faktisk man skal være i dag. Hvad jeg først så var kompliceret i det halve år jeg sad i den 
afviklende bestyrelse, så er det beskæmmende at se vi lever i et så demokratisk samfund, at man som 
almindelig forretningsmand ikke kan påtage dig det job i dag. Det kan du bare ikke. For det er så 
komplekst, der er regler og forordninger… Jeg kan godt forstå at de dygtige bankdirektører kører rundt 
med deres bestyrelser, for det er ikke bare et bestyrelsesjob. Det er det bare ikke. Det synes jeg er lidt 
beklageligt at man har fået kompliceret det sådan.  
Da jeg købte de første Roskilde bank aktier der havde jeg ikke idé om hvem der sad i bestyrelsen. Det 
havde jeg ikke.. Det var først da det begyndt at gå nedad. Fordi så begynder man at få lidt mere kritiske 
øjne.  
 
Interviewer: Men den gik godt da det gik godt? 
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Informant: Ja, der gik det bare rigtig godt. Jamen det var jo et par millioner jeg havde, og her taler vi 
etcifrede i Roskilde bank. Man kunne jo ikke have et så stort privatforbrug… som man tjente på de 
Roskilde bank aktier. Det var helt eventyrligt. Så det er nemmere at smile når det går den vej. Men så 
begynder man at interesserer sig for tingene fordi det går den anden vej.  
 
(unclear)  
 
Interviewer: vi er faktisk færdige, men skyd løs hvis du gerne vil tilføje noget…  
 
Informant: Essensen af min kritik af bestyrelsen… altså der sidder simpelthen så mange tante-bestyrelser 
rundt omkring, og de er bare livsfarlige. Problemet er jo hvis bestyrelsen er svag, så tilegner den 
administrerende direktør sig den magt, og det er jo skidt for der skal være en balance. Det er jo slet ikke 
meningen at bestyrelsen skal rette sig ind med hvad der bliver sagt, og slet ikke når det gælder 
pengeinstitutter, der er det sgu bestyrelsen der skal på banen.  
 
Informant: 
(…)og man så lære hvis man havde lidt mere engegement i dagligdagen, os alle sammen, hvor mange kan 
finde på at stille et spørgsmål til hvis man har lidt aktier til selskab? Det er der sgu ingen der gør. Og hvis 
der så endelig engang imellem en der gør det, så er han en provokatør og en brokkerøv.  
 
Interviewer: 
ja ja, så længe det går godt så bliver man jo ikke modtaget særlig vellidt hvis man stiller spørgsmål.  
 
Informant: 
Nej, men essencen er simpelthen at banktilsynet, når vi taler bank og revetionsansvaret, det er alpha, det 
er alpha.  
 
Interviewer: 
Super. 
 
Informant: 
Men jeg synes godt nok at i er bredt for armene hvis i vil hele den vej rundt, men det er jer der 
disponere(…) hvad taler man om i gammeldags termanlogi antal sider, 80? 
 
Interviewer: 
Nej vi skal have mellem 70 og 90 sider  
 
Informant: 
Nå ok. Det var sgu meget godt skudt.    
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Interviewer: 
Ja, det er lige i midten. Det er sådan mere eller mindre 15 sider per person. Men det er også det vi har 
snakket om, vi kunne godt nøjes med kun at fokusere på Roskilde Bank og så snakke om dét, men 
samtidig er det meget spændende at få de der teorier ind, som er lidt mere traditionelle for det er også 
noget  som et eller andet sted giver et godt overblik hvis man får læst dem igennem. Så det vi bare lige 
prøver at arbejde på nu er at kode det helt sammen..  
 
Informant: 
Men ja, jeg kan se en kordinationsopgave af stor dimension, på de der ting, når i ved så bredt omkring, 
men det er ok, i har også studieerfaring jo.  
 
Interviewer: 
Når ja men nogengange kan man godt farer lidt for vidt ,men det kunne lave en meget god form af at 
ligesom dreje det ned og snakke om hvorfor det gik galt i Roskilde Bank for der jo rigtig mange ting der 
spiller ind.  
 
Informant: 
Men det er altså kun en studierelavant opgave, det er ikke noget der skal udnytte sig i et eller andet 
bogværk eller noget. 
 
Interviewer: 
nej, kun hvis det koster noget rent trænt eller ros(…)  
 
Informant: 
Men alene disponere den her voldsomme opgave, det synes jeg godt nok lyder for mig (…) ok, nu er 5-6 
stykker til det.  
 
Interviewer: 
Ja, vi er 6, men det er stadigvæk en del arbejde, altså også forståelse af de her grundlæggende teorier. De 
er stadig meget tunge teorier.  
 
Informant: 
Ja og man skal læse lidt ved siden af emnet hele tiden.   
 
Interviewer: 
Ja, man skal læse en del mere end det man skal skrive om for at få overblikket. 
 
Informant: 
Jeg må så sige at når i nu siger at i har forventninger om at(…)og defensive og PSS stabilitet at i skal have 
dem i tale også. Jeg er lige ved at sige at jeg tør godt væde med jer at det lykkes jer ikke. 
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Interviewer: 
Det som vi havde håbet på med finansiel stabilitet er at få en af de medarbejder jeg har set, der er nogen 
der er røget med nogen af de bankansatte og det gælder selvfølgelig fra Roskilde Bank også med derind, 
det kunne være meget sjovt at få en af dem i tale men det bliver nok også (…) 
 
Informant: 
Der er så lige en ting som også er væsentlig i denne her sag; loyaliteten fra de tidligere ansatte fra 
Roskilde Bank, den er ekstrem stor, ekstrem stor. Da jeg fik startet den der forening op og jeg kom med i 
bestyrelsen i Roskilde Bank og så bevægede mig ind, så der også dem jeg havde kontakt med før i tiden, 
de troede jeg havde fået Pest, de turde simpelthen ikke… de forbød sig selv at tale med mig, til trods for 
at de også har mistet mange penge, det var godt nok højdommeligt. Så derfor tror jeg i får meget svært 
ved at få en tidligere Roskilde Bank ansat til at rigtig åbne. Det tror jeg ikke i får. Men i skal selvfølge 
forsøge. Men finansiel stabilitet, det er det halve af opgaven hvis i kan få dem under. 
 
Interviewer: 
De har ikke været specielt lette at få fat på. Ellers må vi bare snige os ind til dem.  
 
Informant: 
Jeg vil godt, men jeg vil ikke nævne som kilde. Da to som i måske hvis jeres finansielle stabilitet ikke 
lykkes så ham der hedder Ole Bjørn som startede sin lille potest i 1999, han var bestyrelsesmedlem, han 
kunne have nogle informationer og jeg er rimelig ofte sammen med ham. I må selv tage kontakt til ham, 
men i må gerne sige, hvis i kommer så langt at jeg var personen. Ole Bjørn han bor på Frederiksborgvej i 
Hellerup 123 og så en der hedder Finn Hansen han var bankrådgiver, finanseringsrådgiver i Roskilde 
Bank men faldt så i unode i Søren Kårs tid og kom så til hammervangen hvor hun så nemlige er blevet 
pensioneret. Han hedder sgu ikke Hansen... 
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Appendix 2 
 
 
 
Interview 2 
 
Informant: Jeg kan starte med at fortælle lidt om mit forløb. Jeg kom i lærer i 65 også var indtil 
december 71  i diskontobank, hvor vi så fik en lejlighed i København, og så blev jeg ansat i 
arbejdernes landsbank, for de skulle til at gå over på samme edb-central som diskontobanken 
havde på det tidspunkt og så sagde direktøren, da jeg spurgte ham hvad han synes jeg skulle 
gøre- jeg var træt af at rejse frem og tilbage- ”så skal du sidder derinde”. Dengang var det også 
noget nemmere at flytte poster, så blev jeg så spurgt ”kan du starte i morgen?” ”nej jeg skal lige 
hjem og sige op” men det havde gået rigtig nemt efterfølgende. Så var jeg dér indtil 87. Så fra 
71 til 87? Så var jeg på noget kursus hvor jeg løb ind i min gamle kollega fra diskontobanken, 
han var i mellemtiden blev chef nede i Roskilde banken, så siger han ”jeg mangler en sou-chef 
og er det noget for dig” og på det tidspunkt boede jeg i Roskilde, og det var lidt nemmere end at 
tage til København, fordi vi i mellemtiden var flyttet fra København til Roskilde. Så skulle vi lige 
blive enige om lønnen og det kunne vi godt så. 
Jeg startede i Roskilde bank i 87’ og så pga. en lidt mindre uoverensstemmelse om nogle ting, 
så stoppede jeg der i 2007. Altså inden det hele kollapsede. Det var faktisk meget heldigt. 
Senere var der en for-service bank som der gerne ville bruge mig. Det er igen meget gennem 
ens netværk ”jeg kender en som kender en, som har noget med det at gøre”. Men det var så 
ikke rigtig mig, for det var noget med at være hurtig på tasterne og jeg tror jeg er meget bedre til 
bare sådan at snakke med folk. Sådan er vi så forskellige, og så har jeg jo også lidt alderen 
imod mig med computere og alt det der. Vi blev så enige om, efter prøvetiden, at stoppe. Så 
tænkte jeg ”hvad gør jeg nu?” jamen så gik jeg ud på edb-centralen også så jeg så de banker 
der var tilknyttet der, og der så jeg blandt andet at Amagerbanken var tilknyttet. Chefen for det 
jeg sad med- det var noget med værdipapirer og depoter og sådan noget-  i Amagerbanken, så 
ringede jeg til ham og så kunne jeg komme ind og snakke. Så spurgte han så hvornår jeg kunne 
starte og det kunne jeg forhåbentligt snarest muligt og så var jeg der indtil Amagerbanken 
kollapsede. Dvs. Jeg blev sagt op til d. 31/12 og seks dage senere D. 6 januar blev jeg 65. Og 
nu har jeg så fået forbud imod at søge ind i en bank igen, fordi nu er der tre banker der er gået 
på røven fordi jeg har været der? haha, nej det er pjat! I Arbejdernes landsbank er jeg så 
meget godt og da jeg var er kunde der var min kone ansat i Arbejdernes landsbank i 25 år.  
Nu går jeg jo hjemme og så har jeg meldt mig ind i aktionærforeningen og så løb jeg ind i Ole, 
som i også har snakket med. Ham havde jeg som kunde i Roskilde bank. Heldigvis fik jeg ikke 
kylet en masse Roskilde bank aktier i røven på ham, for det havde vi aftalt på forhånd, da jeg 
blev ansat at jeg ville ikke rådgive omkring Roskilde bank aktier, fordi hvis jeg nu sagde 
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kunderne skulle sælge fordi der var visse risicis, så var jeg nok blevet fyret, og hvis jeg sagde at 
de skulle købe flere, så tror jeg nok at man vi sige, jamen det er fordi i har for mange i jeres 
beholdning. Man kan ikke være rigtig objektiv i sådan en situation. Det fik jeg heldigvis indføjet 
fordi jeg havde ca. 300 kunder, der havde ca. 250.000.000 til sammen, hvor jeg købt og solgte. 
Grunden til vi blev lidt uenige med Roskilde bank, var jo fordi – jeg synes det var udmærket at 
have investeringspapirer til udlandske aktier, men når nu de betalte mig et portfolie-gebyr, så 
synes jeg jo de skulle have danske aktier, for der var man jo lidt inde på at nok var meget smart 
at have investeringspapir i danske aktier også, for så får banken noget returkommission. Det 
har i vel læst lidt om hist og pist? der blev vi så uenige og så ved ikke så ikke hvad i vil spørge 
mig om, og jeg ved heller ikke hvad jeg kan berige jer med, jeg tror ikke det er ret meget, for jeg 
har ikke siddet så højt at jeg kan komme med noget inside viden. Men jeg har læst begge de to 
bøger; en om Roskilde bank og en om Amagerbanken. Det der har slået mig meget, det er at 
det egentlig har været to meget gode arbejdspladser, men det har jo også været en karismatisk 
chef man har haft. Det skal med at Valentine i Roskilde bank, når der var et eller andet så satte 
han sig ned med rengøringsdamer? men hvis det kom lidt højere på strå så var han den hårde 
banan, det har jeg sådan fået at vide, at så bestemte han en hel del. Jeg prøvede så at 
sammenligne de to, jeg ved de kom sammen privat. Roskilde bank havde noget der hed dan-
Finans, og da det så var reddet- der skulle de jo ud og købe ejendomme, biler og alt muligt og 
så lease det ud. Der var de altså kommet ud på gyngende vånd for at sige det mildt. Revisionen 
sad og arbejdede om natten for at få de ting på plads og kreditkontoret især. Så er det jo så at 
man kan undre sig bagefter, at man så hopper ud i ejendoms? når man netop har fået en på 
snuden. Det samme sker inde i Amager banken nogle år før, der kommer de ud med et kanon 
underskud, netop også fordi noget med.. jeg ved ikke om det var pant-breve eller hvad der var, 
men det var et eller andet i hvert fald. Det eneste der sker derinde det var at man fyre 
kreditchefen, hvor vi så her i Roskilde sagde ”ja det burde have været direktøren. Det er han der 
har ansvaret, det burde være ham der blev fyret”. Men han var igen så karismatisk, Knud 
Kristensen? det var ikke ham der var til sidst. Knud Kristensen døde jo, og jeg tror egentlig han 
vidste hvor det bar hen af. Han lå jo på sin rædende kage for at få hjælp, flere gange. Han var jo 
også en hoven skid i mange situationer. Hvis du mødte ham i elevatoren, så hilste han ikke på 
dig eller noget. Men når der blev holdt en masse fester, så optrådte han og det gjorde han godt. 
Han troede han var verdensmester. Det de har tilfælles de to er jo at de begge er 
statsautoriseret revisorer, både Valentine og Knud Kristensen. Men altså jeg ved ikke om man 
kan kalde det griskhed. De troede de kunne gå på vandet.  
 
Interviewer:  Jeg kunne godt tænke mig at spørger, nu hvor du nævner de 300 kunder i 
Roskilde bank. Er det rigtigt forstået at du har styret deres investeringsportfolie så? 
 
Informant: ja, jamen udfra deres ønske om hvor mange aktier de vil have og hvor mange 
obligationer de vil have, så skulle jeg råde dem? men jeg fik jo sådan en limiteringscheck så 
jeg ikke overskred grænserne, for så er det jo klart de kan komme og sige ”hov hov, det kan 
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ikke nytte noget at vi køber 100% aktier når vi kun vil have 40% aktier” men altså jeg bestemte 
så hvad de skulle have og argumenterede selvfølgelig også for det. Jeg synes det gik godt. 
Selvfølgelig ikke perfekt alt sammen, men altså. Da det strammede til i Roskilde bank, blev der 
sagt til nogle at mine kollegaer ”hvis ikke du tror at banken kan forrente egenkapitalen med 
mere end to procent – som vi skulle give i lån dengang i rente – ja, så var det måske smart at 
finde en anden bank. Det er sådan at lægge et pres på folk. Det var ikke meget, men der var 
nogen der fortalte at det var nok.  
Jeg havde engang 6000 aktier i Roskilde bank, og da det var sjovest var kursen 700. Men da 
det lukkede havde jeg kun lånene tilbage. Jeg troede jo sagtens renten kunne komme op over 
to procent. Min egen kapitalrente lå på 30 , så derfor var det også lidt af et chock for mig.  
Men så kommer jeg altså ned i den der aktionærforening og har lige meldt mig ind sammen 
med Ole, og så siger de dernede at vi er de eneste der havde sag om Roskilde bank. De havde 
så en formand som havde analyseret den og sagt at det her ville ende galt. Jeg kan huske han 
blev nævnt i Roskilde bank, man var bare ikke så imponeret over ham.  
 
Interviewer: Det er klart man ikke var så imponeret over ham hvis han har snakket imod at købe 
Roskilde bank aktier. Så kan han ikke have været så populær.  
 
Informant: Det vidste jeg jo ikke noget om på det tidspunkt, men jeg kan bare huske at han ikke 
blev omtalt så positivt.  
 
Interviewer: Jeg synes du sagde noget med at du havde fået lov til ikke at rådgive folk i at købe 
Roskilde bank aktier?. 
 
Informant: Ja, det havde jeg. Vi blev enige om at hvis kunderne skal ind i portofolie var det 
smartest at holde? altså man kommer på et tidspunkt i et dilemma, også hvis det var gået den 
anden vej. Så ville man tænke ”hvorfor skulle jeg ikke købe nogle flere af dem?” her det jo rart 
at kunne sige ”det bestemmer i selv”. Jeg blev spurgt flere gange ”synes du vi skal købe” og der 
svarede jeg ”det vil jeg slet ikke forholde mig til, det bestemmer i selv”  
 
Interviewer: Det lyder som et enkelt stående tilfælde at man som investeringsrådgiver at det var 
sådan.. eller var det?  
 
Informant: Det var kun mig der sad med det der?  
 
Interviewer: Det er min opfattelse at andre bankrådgivere de?  
 
Informant: det var ikke returkommissionen.. men nogle fik godskrevet et eller andet hvis de 
kunne sælge mange Roskilde bank aktier. De kæmpede jo mod hinanden om hvem der havde 
solgt flest og samtidig låne ud til at købe dem.. den ene med det andet? såå..  
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Interviewer: er det også af din opfattelse at der var flere rådgivere som dengang.. jeg går udfra 
at der var flere ansatte dengang som ikke var klar over hvor skidt det stod til?   
 
Informant: ja, det går jeg også stærkt udfra?  
 
Interviewer: at der er mange som har.. helt op til de sidste dage op til at Roskilde bank 
kollapsede..  
 
Informant: En af mine rigtig gode venner, han var direktør. Jeg tror han havde for 16.000.000 på 
et tidspunkt og så tænkte jeg, hvis ikke han ved noget så er der nok ikke noget.. forstå mig nu 
ret.. så kan man så sige, vi ved jo at Valentine han solgte ikke alle sine aktier, det kan i jo ikke 
vide, for det er insider.. men vi ved jo også at det kom jo frem at et par stykker, blandt andet 
vicedirektøren de solgte i den periode hvor.. efter regnskabet er aflagt så har man fire uger hvor 
man må handle, helt legalt og det var der de solgte, så det var ikke noget? der blev lavet nogle 
optioner som udløb der. Men jeg mener ikke Valentine gjorde?  
 
Interviewer: Nej, det gjorde han ikke og hvis han fik solgt nogle, så fik han ikke solgt særlig 
mange?  
 
Informant: Jeg var der heller ikke fra starten, så jeg ved ikke alt.. men jeg ved at de der par 
stykker, de fik solgt hvad de helt legalt gerne måtte gøre.  
 
Interviewer: Det vi snakkede om før på vej herned, mht. regulering fra statens side og 
finanstilsynet. Deres arbejde i forbindelse med Roskilde bank, er det noget du har en mening 
omkring eller indsigt i? Om de ligesom har trådt hårdt nok ind.  
Informant: Altså vi havde jo, jeg tror det var engang i 90’erne?. der havde vi jo en 
bestyrelsesforman som ligesom sagde at nu gider han ikke mere, han stillede sig op og sagde 
at han havde nedlagt sit mandat fordi han ville ikke mere og jeg har hans tale, hvis jeg kan finde 
den. Han siger lige nøjagtigt alle de her ting, og så fortæller han mig at han også har kontaktet 
finanstilsynet og han havde vidst nok ikke fået svar endnu. Så der er nogle som ikke har været 
påpasselige nok og så er det jo pudsigt at ham der var direktør for finanstilsynet, det er ham der 
nu er røget over på finansiel stabilitet. Havde det været privat erhverv så havde han fået et lås i 
røven, for han var slet ikke omhyggelig nok med sit arbejde.  
 
Interviewer: Bjerre Nielsen, hedder han vidst. Han kommer jo fra finanstilsynet over til finansiel 
stabilitet og de skrider så ind i Amagerbank, og det har der jo så også været tale om hvorvidt 
det var lidt for hurtigt.  
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Informant: Jamen det viste sig jo nok at når du kan give så høj en procent? staten giver et lån 
på 13.500.000 mia. til Amagerbank.. ja, pludselig ved jeg ikke hvad pokker der sker. De tager jo 
ham direktøren over fra Midtbank. Han bliver jo sat ind i bestyrelsen for finansiel stabilitet eller 
finanstilsynet, det tør jeg ikke sige, men så bliver han lige pludselig administrerende direktør 
efter den kollapser der. Men tilbagebetalingsprocenten på det lån – de havde jo nogle 
obligationslån- der kom hele tiden penge tilbage, og så var de oppe på nogen og 90%. Det er 
det sammen som 100%, for de havde dækket sig ind hele vejen. Så der er jo folk der snakker 
om at det slet ikke skulle have være lukket.  
 
Interviewer: så man kan sige at der blev skredet meget for sent ind i Roskilde bank og måske 
lidt over til den anden side med Amager banken.  
 
Informant: ja, det synes jeg? man kan sige at i Roskilde bank der lod man bare stå til, så hvis 
han (Valentine) havde været så karismatisk og kunne sælge varen så de turde ikke rigtigt gøre 
ham noget. Han havde jo vist resultater igennem mange år?  
 
Interviewer: ja, og der var nok heller ikke meget modspil. Nu nævner du Ole Bjørn, men han var 
jo sådan set det eneste modspil?  
 
Informant: ja, jeg fornemmer også at alle kreditsager, var efterretningssager, hvor man ikke 
rigtig gjorder noget? men bare sagde ”det tager vi til efterretning”.  
 
Interviewer: Er det en normalhed at de ikke er så kvalificerede dem der sidder i bestyrelser i 
småbanker?  
 
Informant: ja, det er det jo. Mange gange er det en eller anden gårdejer som har mange penge i 
banken og mange aktier, og når så direktøren han siger ”hvem vil det passe mig bedst og ha’. 
For nu kan vi tage Roskilde bank, de havde BR-legetøj som kunde, og det var helt naturligt for 
mig at man havde fået sådan én ind?  
Jeg kan huske en lille sjov historie jeg fik fortalt engang; til en generalforsamling i Roskilde 
bank, havde Valentine rejst sig op og spurgt ”hvorfor siger i mig ikke imod?” så var der en 
anden der rejste sig op og svarede ”jamen det er fordi vi ved du bliver sur hvis ikke du får din 
vilje.” For det fik han jo gerne?  
 
Interviewer: Ja, det virker som om han har været overdominerende overfor sin bestyrelse. Der 
er ikke nogen der har turde sige ham imod.  
 
Informant: Nej, men det er også fordi han har foreslået dem som han kunne styre. Forinden var 
der ham Henrik Muller, faren til Peter Muller. Hver torsdag kom han op i investeringsforeningen 
– han havde en del penge – så mødte jeg ham og der og så skulle jeg spørger om alt det der. 
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Han har jo også været forlovet med Lisa Nørgaard. Det var sådan set hans far der startede 
banken, det er derfor man har det der matador . Det er simpelthen den gamle Muller. Han 
kunne styre den unge Valentine dengang, men efterfølgende har det knippet lidt med at finde 
nogen  
 
Interviewer: ja, så var sønnen måske ikke ligeså karismatisk. Valentine har jo også respekt for 
den ældre Muller.  
Informant: Ja, Valentine har jo også været i lærde oppe i Roskilde bank og han var ikke ret 
meget interesseret i Roskilde bank. Han skulle bare have tiden til at gå. Det er det jeg hører. 
Det var jo nok ikke interessant nok for ham, men så blev han jo statsautoriseret revisor og så 
søgte han på lige fod med nogle andre og så blev det altså ham. Dengang skete der heller ikke 
noget i banken og så kom der en som lige skulle feje og sætte gang i butikken. Det der er meget 
sjovt det er, at flere sagde til mig de havde besluttet at sælge alle deres aktier når Valentine gik 
af. Han gik jo af godt et år før det hele kollapsede, så dem der fulgte deres råd de har klaret sig 
meget godt. Det er bare dem der ikke kom ud af kapellet som betalte gildet. Det var almindelige 
kunder som havde lov til at sælge, de havde sagt ”vi tror ikke på at banken mere når Valentine 
ikke er der”. Jeg vil jo så stadigvæk påstå at det er Valentine der har sagt ja til alle de kunder. 
Som vi sagde i Amagerbanken, ”hvis der var en kunde vi ikke ville have kunne vi bare sende 
ham ned til Valentine”. Det var derfor der ikke var nogen der gad til rydde op, for man vidste jo 
godt hvem man havde engageret sig med. Der sker lidt det samme i Amagerbanken. Der må 
være noget gemt der. Men det er jo egentlig direktøren fra Arbejdernes landsbank, de havde 
også fået en henvendelse, men da de ikke kunne få reel besked. De vidste jo også godt hvad 
for nogle kunder Amagerbanken havde. Man havde altid betragtet Arbejdernes landsbank som 
lidt af en sløv bank, jeg kan huske da jeg startede deroppe i 87 at jeg tænkte ”hvordan fanden 
kunne jeg holde ud at være der uden at der skete noget, man tjente ikke penge eller noget”. Nu 
har de jo paradoksalt nok flyttet ind i Roskilde banks kontor. Så et eller andet sted har de jo 
lykkedes med nogle ting.  
 
Interviewer: så det kunne godt betale sig at være konservativ? Der var måske ikke grund til at 
lave for meget om.  
 
Informant: jamen de havde jo en anden struktur. De havde penge fra fagforeninger. Det havde 
penge nok. Der kom nok penge i kassen. Men de har jo heller ikke særlig meget erhvervsliv 
eller byggeri. Men det er de ved at få mere af. Ham direktøren fra arbejdernes landsbank, han 
var elev. Vi blev enige om at vi skulle på Roskilde festival ham og jeg. Så han lå og sov på mit 
stuegulv om natten dér. Så mødte jeg ham til generalforsamling dernede i Arbejdernes 
landsbank og så  sagde han, han var ikke sikker på om han kom i år. Han var en herlig knægt 
som boede alene i et sommerhus og spillede guitar. Der var sådan lidt hippie over ham 
dengang og vi gik jo og hyggede os. Og så ser man ham i dag med slips og det hele. Han gør 
det godt.. jeg snakker udenom ik’? 
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Interviewer: nej det er helt fint. Jeg vil bare gerne samle op på det du sagde før . nu har du 
nævnt de der forskellige byggematador, så vil jeg hører: sådan en som Jørgen Olsen, altså 
hvordan var stemningen i banken? Var der noget at mærke når en kunde som ham kom ind og 
fik lov til at tage så store lån. Var der nogen som rynkede på næsen over det eller synes det 
virkede meget underligt?  
 
Informant: jamen jeg tror slet ikke? altså i mit hierarki blev det slet ikke nævnt. Det der var jo 
med ham, var at han kom med et beløb og ville sætte noget mere i gang. Jeg tror det var 
omkring 50 mio. Så siger man i banken ”det har vi ikke brug for, du kan låne det hele hos os” så 
var han tilsyneladende meget velkommen, i hvert fald hos dem der bestemmer?  
 
Interviewer: Det bliver omtalt i flere artikler at han kommer ind med de 50 mio og vil gerne give 
dem som garanti og de vil kun have – jeg ved så ikke hvem der sidder der på det tidspunkt- 
men de tager kun garantien og sikkerhed i halvdelen af overskuddet, hvis såfremt byggerunden 
bliver færdig oppe i Birkerød, og det virker jo helt ? det er jo imod alt fornuft.  
 
Informant: ja, jeg har også været over og hører ham og det er rystende. Det er rystende fordiså 
kan jeg jo sidde og sige ”hvem er det der har informeret om det?” man havde jo fået en 
professionel ind i bestyrelsen. Ham trykdirektøren? 
 
Interviewer: ja, det var Ib Mardal?  
 
Informant: ja, Mardal nemlig. Jeg tror nok det havde været slemt for ham, for da han skulle 
(unclear) ? så er der to direktører i Arbejdernes landsbank. Han havde så spurgt en fra 
bestyrelsen i Roskilde bank ”hvordan fanden kan i lade sådan noget ske?” så havde han svaret 
”vi fik slet ikke noget at vide”.  
Der står også i bogen om Roskilde bank at der blev holdt møde med bestyrelsesformanden og 
Valentine dagen før bestyrelsesmøderne?  
 
Interviewer: man får jo på fornemmelsen at det er Niels Valentine, Lars Jensen som de eneste 
der har haft indsigt i de fleste ting?  
 
Informant: ja, Lars Nielsen kom over fra sparekassen inden han blev sendt i København. Han 
blev i første omgang chef for en byggeafdeling og senere blev han chef for hele butikken og 
tjente jo også gode penge, men det er jo klart hvis han kun fokusere på udlånet, så er der også 
nogen der skal drage indlånet ind som man kan låne ud af.  
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Interviewer: Altså nu stiller vi nogle teorier op i vores opgave mod hinanden for at undersøge 
hvordan den økonomiske krise kan ske? kan du fortælle lidt om hvordan bank verden så ud før 
70’erne hvor alt bliver liberaliseret?  
 
Informant: ja, der eksisterede jo slet ikke samme form for konkurrence dengang. Altså Danmark 
har jo så mange små-banker så det siger spar 2, i forhold til Sverige og alle mulige andre lande. 
Derfor sker der en naturlig konsolidering, men der var ikke nogen der var interesseret i at sige 
farvel til deres bestyrelsesposter. Man burde jo have slået sig sammen, som der skete dengang 
du havde danske bank som overtog provins bankerne og du havde Nordea der overtog flere 
banker. Der burde man frivilligt nok have gået med noget før. Men vi har jo altid haft den lille 
hyggelige bank. Men det kunne jo ikke blive ved med at hænge sammen. Det jeg ikke forstår 
med Roskilde bank det er en som Jens Winther der var bestyrelsesformand så lang tid, han slet 
ikke er nævnt nogen steder i alt det her. For han er jo egentlig som bestyrelsesformand lige inde 
Peter muller han kom til og han kom jo til et eller to år før det hele kollapsede. Han er vel 
egentlig medskyldig så, i en eller andet forstand, men han slipper for videre tiltale.  
 
Interviewer: ja, der er jo stillet erstatningskrav på 1 mia fra finansiel stabilitet, men han er ikke 
en af dem som der er blevet rettet erstatningskrav mod?  
Informant: det tror jeg ikke?  
 
Interviewer: ja han har jo slet ikke på nogen måde været kvalificeret til at være 
bestyrelsesforman i en bank?  
 
Informant: det vil jeg ikke sige, men man kan have en fornemmelse om det?  
 
Interviewer: jamen en ting er at han er racerkører og bil handler, men udover det er han jo også 
et kæmpe lån i banken?  
 
Informant: ja han havde jo en forretning derude..  
 
Interviewer: jamen det var mange millioner han skyldte den bank han sidder i bestyrelsen. Plejer 
det ikke at være god praksis at man ikke har så stort engagement i banken?  
 
Informant: altså det var jo smart af Valentine at vælge sådan en til bestyrelsesformand, det er 
min tanke, men det er ikke noget i må referere videre? det er jo bare noget jeg tænker, når jeg 
skal forstå hvordan det hænger sammen.  
 
Interviewer: mange tak, det var godt at få et overview, så hvis der ikke er nogen der vil tilføje 
noget 
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Appendix 3 
 
Interview tre  
 
Interviewer: Jeg kan egentlig lige starte med at introducere dig for hvad vi har tænkt os med 
projektet. Vores projekt omhandler Roskilde banks kollaps, og samtidig har vi inkorporeret den 
økonomiske krise og hvordan den har haft betydning for kollapset. I den forstand har vi brugt 
Keyens og Minsky og stillet det op mod Friedman, som modsætninger og for derefter at rage 
konklusioner og se ligheder, men også for at se hvordan man i fremtiden kan forbygge? Vi har 
derudover inkorporeret noget Principal agent for at få et mere nuanceret billede af det hele.  
 
Informant: altså i vil diskuterer hvordan banker bliver styret og ledet?  
 
Interviewer: ja, det fandt vi ret hurtigt ud af, er en vigtig del når vi har at gøre med banker. Det er 
ikke bare at se på økonomien, man skal også se hvordan bankerne er blevet drevet.  
 
Informant: Altså i spænder meget bredt, der er dels virksomhedsøkonomiske og 
makroøkonomiske aspekter som er gældende omkring bankregulering og pengeskabelse og de 
ændringer i reguleringerne. Og så det makroøkonomiske perspektiv; hvad betyder den 
finansielle sektor for at den samfundsøkonomiske udvikling i mere bred forstand og dels det 
som understøtter en evt. vækst i bankerne. Det er jo det Minsky først og fremmest kigger på, og 
man kan vel også sige Keyens. De kigger først og fremmest på det makroøkonomiske 
perspektiv. Samspillet mellem det finansielle sektor og økonomi. Keyens var som en af de 
første til at tale om monetary theory of profuction, hvor man tidligere talte om real theory of 
production. Han bryder ligesom med det traditionelle. Der man så kan sige er at når i stiller 
keyens og friedman op over for hinanden, så kan man jo sige at friedman er i virkeligheden 
tilbagevende til the real theory of production, hvor det monetære sektor og pengeskabelsen 
øver indflydelse på inflation og inflationsudviklingen. Der taler man jo simpelthen om et udtryk 
der hedder dichotomy, som betyder adskillelse hvor man på den ene side har det real 
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økonomiske forløb, hvor det gælder om at få markedet til at fungere bedst muligt, og der er 
begrænset rum for økonomisk politik og så har man den finansielle sektor som lever til eget liv, 
fordi finance er det der skal olierer systemet og få det til at kører, og hælder man for meget olie 
på, jamen så skaber man finansiel overtryk som kommer ud i form af inflation.  
Alt det her ved i formegentlig godt, men hvis man skal modstille dem er det ligesom at sige det 
klassiske – og med friedman – det neoklassiske. Giver det mening det her?  
 
Interviewere: ja?  
 
Informant: så har vi jo den keneysian tilgang, som jo grundlæggende siger at de her to sektorer 
ikke kan adskilles fordi real økonomi ikke kun styres af markedsmæssige processer men også 
af ustabilitet og usikkerhed og en af de sektorer som bidrager til usikkerhed er den finansielle 
sektor, fordi prisdannelsen ikke er rationel, men i perioder præget af flokmentalitet, hvor man 
kan sige at der en disharmoni mellem den finansielle sektors interesser, i hvert fald i de perioder 
hvor de er domineret af spekulation?. (unclear)  
Keyens siger at det moderne økonomi- han taler jo i 30’erne- og er det som Minsky så taget op 
efter er i ”could it happen again”- altså kunne 30’erne gentages. Et af keyens konklusioner var jo 
at cracket på wall street i ’29 udløser – det er ikke det som er årsagen til krisen, men det er med 
til at opbygge nogle spændinger – der kommer nogle voldsomme rystelser i den finansielle 
sektor som så kaster bølger ind over real økonomi og gør faktisk at den finansielle sektor har 
svært ved overhovedet at fungere fordi de –roskilde bank var et eksempel- løber ind i egene 
problemer. Vi skal jo have den der olie til at finansiere systemet.  
Man kan sige de to har forskellige måder at analysere det makroøkonomiske system på, så 
kunne man måske tale om hvad deres syn er på bankdrift.  
 
Interviewer: kan man sige at det der skete med Roskilde bank og den finansielle krise, det var 
ikke sket hvis det var som keyens han?.  
 
Informant: Det kan man ikke stille op sådan. For man kan ikke garderer mod bad banking og det 
er det man siger nu er mantraret i banksektoren. Jeg talte lidt med en fra bankrådet og han 
sagde ”de banker der går ned – bad mangement. Der er ikke noget galt i sektoren. Vi levere 
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varen, men de der nok, det er fordi at de? (unclear) Det andet sæt af forklaringen er jo at når 
makroøkonomi og makroøkonomi spiller sammen og man får skabt en makroøkonomisk 
udvikling som bare får lov til at vokse, mens politikerne står og klapper i hænderne mens det 
smider kul på bålet. Og så har man en banksektor der kan skabe ubegrænset med 
pengemængde, så får man jo nogle selvforstærkende processer? Fornuftige mennesker kunne 
så have sagt at private banker ikke selv kunne standse og derfor har vi et makroøkonomisk 
ansvar, at det her ikke løber løbsk. For de kan ikke se selv, med den regulering der er, og 
specielt fordi man havde mindsket reguleringen tidligere indtil 80’erne. Dengang havde man jo 
en meget meget strammere bankregulering med hensyn til hvor meget man kan låne ud?  
 
Interviewer: hvad med finanstilsynet? For de kunne jo have reguleret  
 
Informant: finanstilsynet havde ikke særlig stor magt og ikke mindst efter man havde forpligtet 
bankerne til at tage aktivt op til markedsværdi. Når man så er inde i en periode hvor 
markedsværdien er stødt stigende på alle aktiver så får du blæst balance op og samtidig egen 
kapitalen op. Når aktiverne bliver opskrevet og passiverne – altså det man har lånt- forbliver 
uændret, jamen så er det egen kapital der vokser, og derfor kunne de jo også udskrive noget 
store overskud. Hvorfor? Jamen fordi de regnskabsmæssige overskud var enorme og ingen 
tænkte på at når aktiverne begynder at falde igen, så bliver egen kapital ramt ligeså hårdt og det 
er jo den situation som stort set alle pengeinstitutter befandt sig i, da de så skulle have 
bankpakke to. Nu var aktiverne faldet og så skrumpede egen kapital, så de skulle have kapital 
ind for ikke at gå konkurs. Så forståelsen af den dynamik der er mellem den enkelte banks 
resultat og så hele det makroøkonomiske set-up mht. vurdering af aktier, det havde man ikke 
tilstrækkelig forståelse for.  
 
Interviewer: og det er jo så ret skræmmende, for en ting er jo at det er grotesk hvordan det blev 
ledet i Roskilde bank med bad banking og dårlige dispositioner men danske bank dengang?  
 
Informant: ja, man skal jo huske at i hvert fald indtil 2006 så erklærede Roskilde bank sig som 
en af the wonder boys og ham valentine? alle skulle jo gøre som roskilde bank. Og det gjorde 
de fleste, og danske bank som fylde halvdelen af den samlede sektor de satte jo også 
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samfundsøkonomien på spil, ved at have et enormt indlånsunderskud og at ind i Irland, som var 
endnu værre.  
 
Interviewer: Men det er jo også sådan set det man kan se ved Minsky, det er jo en direkte 
forbindelse mellem hvordan det hele vokser sig man ser ikke særlig klart og så vender det lige 
pludselig og så må man prøve at redde sig selv ud af det.  
 
Informant: ja, bankerne er jo afhængige af hinanden. Bankerne med indlånsunderskud er jo 
afhængige af at andre banker tør låne dem penge. Og det er så det der er problemet når det 
kollapser for så går bankerne i panik.  
Det er jo naivt at tro at den finansielle sektor ved bedst selv og lever et rationelt liv som stort set 
ikke har nogen betydning for økonomien?  
 
Interviewer: Men den kom sådan efter at der var gået nok tid – altså efter cracket i 30’erne.  
 
Informant: historien gentager sig ikke, men omvendt kan man sige det ikke er nødvendigt at 
gentage historiens fejltagelser.  
 
Interviewer: hvis man nu tager Danmark som eksempel, vil du så mene at bankverden, den 
finansielle sektor og beslutningstagerne de har lært at af det her?  
 
Informant: der er en iboende dynamik i den finansielle sektor som skaber ustabilitet, men 
omvendt er en forudsætning for produktion og vækst og investeringer er jo at den finansielle 
sektor fungere. Lige at finde reguleringspunktet, det er jo et forskningsprojekt. 
Reguleringspunktet det ændre sig jo også i takt med globaliseringen. Indtil 80’erne havde vi 
stort set lukket grænser mht. Finansiel kapital. Der måtte man jo ikke låne af udlandet. Da jeg 
var dreng, så skulle man have en togbillet for at købe udlandske valuta.  
 
